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ABSTRACT 
 
For most of human history, the essential nature of creativity was understood to be cumulative and 
collective.  This notion has been largely forgotten by modern policies that regulate creativity and 
speech.  As hard as it may be to believe, the most valuable components of our immortal culture were 
created under a fully open regime with regard to access to pre-existing expressions and re-use.  From 
the Platonic mimesis to Shakespeare’s “borrowed feathers,” the largest part of our culture has been 
produced under a paradigm in which imitation—even plagiarism—and social authorship formed 
constitutive elements of the creative moment.  Pre-modern creativity spread from a continuous line 
of re-use and juxtaposition of pre-existing expressive content, transitioning from orality to textuality 
and then melding the two traditions.  The cumulative and collaborative character of the oral-
formulaic tradition dominated the development of epic literature.  The literary pillars of Western 
culture, the Iliad and the Odyssey, were fully forged in the furnace of that tradition.  Later, under 
the aegis of Macrobius’ art of rewriting and the Latin principles of imitatio, medieval epics grew out 
of similar dynamics of sharing and recombination of formulas and traditional patterns.  
Continuations, free re-use, and the re-modeling of iconic figures and characters, such as King Arthur 
and Roland, made chansons de geste and romance literature powerful vehicles in propelling cross-
country circulation of culture. 
 
The parallelism between past and present highlights the incapacity of the present copyright system 
to recreate the cumulative and collaborative creative process that proved so fruitful in the past.  In 
particular, the constant development and recursive use of iconic characters, which served as an 
engine for creativity in epic literature, is but a fading memory.  This is because our policies for 
creativity are engineered in a fashion that stymies the re-use of information and knowledge, rather  
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 than facilitating it.  Under the current regime, intellectual works are supposedly created as 
perfect, self-sustaining artifacts from the moment of their creation.  Any modifications, derivations, 
and cumulative additions must secure preventive approval and must be paid off, as if they were 
nuisances to society. 
 
Rereading the history of aesthetics is particularly inspiring at the dawn of the networked age.  The 
dynamics of sharing of pre-modern creativity parallel the features of digital networked creativity.  As 
in the oral-formulaic tradition, digital creativity reconnects its exponential generative capacity to the 
ubiquity of participatory contributions.  Additionally, the formula—the single unit to be used and re-
used, worked and re-worked—is the building block of the remix culture as well as the oral formulaic 
tradition.  Today, in an era of networked mass collaboration, ubiquitous online fan communities, 
user-based creativity, digital memes, and remix culture, the enclosure of knowledge brought about 
by an ever-expanding copyright paradigm is felt with renewed intensity.  Therefore, I suggest that 
the communal, cumulative, social and collaborative nature of creativity and authorship should be 
rediscovered and should drive our policies.  In order to plead my case, I have asked for the support of 
the most unexpected witnesses. 
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REDISCOVERING CUMULATIVE CREATIVITY FROM THE ORAL FORMULAIC 
TRADITION TO DIGITAL REMIX:  CAN I GET A WITNESS? 
GIANCARLO F. FROSIO* 
I. COMPLAINT 
In the short window during the 1980s between the emergence of digital 
sampling and the first decisions that outlawed it, Public Enemy released its album It 
Takes a Nation of Millions, which was critically acclaimed for its influence on hip-
hop.  Building his sonic wall, Public Enemy attempted to make use of bricks kneaded 
with water and clay of a communitarian musical tradition.  Public Enemy linked 
together past and future:  avant-garde music with the traditional African American 
and Caribbean culture of musical borrowing.  In an interview given after the judicial 
turmoil that took down digital sampling, Carlton Douglas Ridenhour, the frontman of 
the rap band Public Enemy, better known by his stage name “Chuck D,” explained 
the impact of copyright on Public Enemy’s creativity: 
Public Enemy’s music was affected more than anybody’s because we were 
taking thousands of sounds . . . .  The sounds were all collaged together to 
make a sonic wall.  Public Enemy was affected because it is too expensive to 
defend against a claim.  So we had to change our whole style, the style of It 
Takes a Nation and Fear of a Black Planet, by 1991 . . . .  Putting a hundred 
small fragments into a song meant that you had a hundred different people 
to answer to . . . .  It’s easier to sample a groove than it is to create a whole 
new collage.  That entire collage element is out the window.1 
A few years later, in Caught, Can I Get a Witness?, Chuck D bragged “[c]aught, 
now in court ‘cause I stole a beat / This is a sampling sport / Mail from the courts and 
jail / Claims I stole the beats that I rail . . .  I found this mineral that I call a beat / I 
paid zero.”2  The same witness may be of use for an entire generation of digital 
remixers, vidders, creators of “machinima,” developers of fangames, fanfiction 
writers, and users generating content. 
                                                                                                                                                 
* cc-by Giancarlo F. Frosio 2014.  Residential Fellow, Stanford Law School, Center for Internet 
and Society; S.J.D., Duke University School of Law, Durham, North Carolina; LL.M., Duke 
University School of Law, Durham, North Carolina; LL.M., Strathclyde University, Glasgow, UK; 
J.D., Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy.  You can reach me at 
giancarlo.frosio@law.stanford.edu or gcfrosio@gmail.com. 
1 Kembrew McLeod, How Copyright Law Changed Hip-Hop:  An Interview with Public Enemy’s 
Chuck D and Hank Shocklee, in Cutting Across Media:  Appropriation Art, Interventionist Collage, 
and Copyright Law 155 (Kembrew McLeod & Rudolf Kuenzli eds., 2011) [hereinafter McLeod, How 
Copyright Changed Hip-Hop]; see also KEMBREW MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:  RESISTANCE 
AND REPRESSION IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 62–114 (2007) [hereinafter MCLEOD, 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION]. 
2 See McLeod, How Copyright Changed Hip-Hop, supra note 1, at 152. 
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II. WITNESS EVIDENCE 
In the pages that follow, I will try to come up with supporting evidence to 
demonstrate that digging for “minerals,” appropriating and reusing them to produce 
follow-on creativity is exactly what creativity is all about.  I will make my argument 
by telling you of a postmodern dream I had.  In my oneiric fantasy, I have tried to 
answer Dangerous Chuck’s call for a witness.  The most unexpected of them came to 
support his case. 
A. Homer’s Testimony:  Iliad, Odyssey, and the Oral Formulaic Tradition 
It was late in the morning when the judge summoned the first witness.  A blind 
old man walked in from the backdoor of the courtroom. 
 “Can you state your name, sir?” Chuck’s D’s attorney asked. 
“My name is Homer.  And I have never existed, in fact.  I am a back-
formation.  I have become the archetypal poet through a process of 
‘authorization’.”3  As Gregory Nagy puts it, Homer is “retrojected as the 
original genius of heroic songs, the proto-poet whose poetry is reproduced by 
a continuous succession of performers.”4 
Homer’s works have been surrounded by many questions related to the 
composition, authorship, and date of the Iliad and Odyssey.  This debate crossing the 
ancient, middle and modern era is known as the Homeric Question. 5   In the 
eighteenth century, the Homeric Question became ontological.  The very existence of 
Homer himself was put under scrutiny.  François Hédelin, Gianbattista Vico, and 
Friedrich August Wolf argued that Homer was a symbol of poetic genius.6  Setting 
aside whether Homer had really existed or was only a symbolic figure, the process of 
making the Homeric verse is the central question to bear relevance in the quest for 
the origins of the Iliad and Odyssey.  That process was dissected and unveiled in the 
last century by the innovative theories of an emerging school of philological studies, 
spearheaded by Milman Parry.  As a result of these theories, the making of the 
Homeric verse would be the outcome of a collaborative and cumulative creative 
                                                                                                                                                 
3  See ANDREW BENNETT, THE AUTHOR 34 (Routledge 2005) (discussing Homer’s 
“authorization”). 
4 GREGORY NAGY, HOMERIC QUESTIONS 92 (Univ. of Tex. Press 1996); JAN DE VRIES, HEROIC 
SONG AND HEROIC LEGEND 2–10 (Ayer Co. 1963). 
5 See generally, e.g., NAGY, supra note 4, at 92; HOMERIC QUESTIONS: ESSAYS IN PHILOLOGY, 
ANCIENT HISTORY AND ARCHEOLOGY, INCLUDING THE PAPERS OF A CONFERENCE ORGANIZED BY THE 
NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE AT ATHENS (15 MAY 1993) (JAN PAUL CRIELAARD, J. C. GIEBEN 1995) 
[HEREINAFTER HOMERIC QUESTIONS]; JAN DE VRIES, HEROIC SONG AND HEROIC LEGEND 2-10 
(Oxford University Press 1963). 
6  See FRANÇOIS HÉDELIN, CONJECTURES ACADÉMIQUES, OU, DISSERTATION SUR L’ILIADE 
(Honoré Champion 2010) (1715); GIANBATTISTA VICO, DISCOVERY OF THE TRUE HOMER (Cornell 
Univ. Press 1984) (1725); FRIEDRICH AUGUST WOLF, PROLEGOMENA TO HOMER (Princeton Univ. 
Press 1985) (1795). 
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process that lasted for centuries.  This insight is today known as the oral-formulaic 
theory.7 
Milman Parry was a brilliant scholar who died at the age of thirty-three.  
Nonetheless, Parry had enough time to revolutionize the study of early epic poetry by 
disclosing the oral and formulaic origin of the works later textualized as the Iliad 
and the Odyssey.8  The textual evidence suggested to Parry that the written poems 
emerged from an evolutionary process in which composition, performance, and 
diffusion interacted to create the epics we know as the Iliad and the Odyssey.9  Parry 
demonstrated that the Homeric verse had a very different style and form than those 
of later poets, and “that it is to a very great extent a language of traditional formulas, 
created in the course of a long period of time by poets who composed in the mind 
without the aid of writing.”10  Parry singled out the Homeric epithet as the pivotal 
evidence inferring the oral heritage of the poems. 11   Parry noted that Homeric 
epithets, such as Achilles “swift-footed,” Hector “shining-helmet,” Hera “cow-eyed,” 
“divine Odysseus,” Athena “gray-eyed,” the “rosy fingered dawn,” or the sea “as dark 
as wine,” changed according to the needs of meter, not according to the needs of the 
narrative context.  Again, many lines in a passage, groups of lines, or even larger 
narrative patterns were wholly reproduced in one or more other passages of the 
Homeric works.  Parry concluded that the repetition of ready-made expression would 
have found no meaningful explanation, unless that text predated its origin in an oral 
tradition.  The formulae were only functional devices to be used and re-used to help 
the aoidous to remember and perform in the given length of the verse. 
The poetic diction permeating the Homeric works was, therefore, the cumulative 
creation of many generations of oral poets over centuries.  “From generation to 
generation bards had preserved words and phrases which . . . could be drawn on for 
the making of poetry,” Parry noted.12  Generations of poets had created a “grammar 
of poetry” to be superimposed on the grammar of the language. 13   Aoidoi and 
rhapsodes could draw from this grammar to perform their poetic speech.  In reusing 
this common stock, poets would add their own contributions.  In case of a particularly 
brilliant aoidous, perhaps such as Homer, the original contribution to the common 
stock of formulas and verses could have been more substantial than in other 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 See generally JOHN M. FOLEY, ORAL-FORMULAIC THEORY AND RESEARCH:  AN INTRODUCTION 
AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (Garland Publ’g 1985) [hereinafter FOLEY, ORAL-FORMULAIC 
THEORY]; WALTER J. ONG, ORALITY AND LITERACY:  THE TECHNOLOGIZING OF THE WORD (Routledge 
2012) (1982). 
8 See MILMAN PARRY, THE MAKING OF HOMERIC VERSE (Adam Parry ed., Oxford Univ. Press 
1971). 
9 See NAGY, supra note 4, at 30 (stating that composition, performance, and diffusion are the 
three interacting aspects of production and development of Homeric poetry). 
10 DENYS PAGE, HISTORY AND THE HOMERIC ILIAD (Univ. of Cal. Press 1959) (commenting on 
Parry’s Masters of Arts dissertation, in which he first proposed the oral-formulaic theory). 
11 See PARRY, supra note 8, at 1–190. 
12 Id. at 195. 
13 ALBERT BATES LORD, THE SINGER OF TALES 36 (Stephen Mitchell & Gregory Nagy eds., 
Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed. 2000; see also Egbert J. Bakker, Noun-Epithet Formulas, Milman Parry, 
and the Grammar of Poetry, in Homeric Questions, supra note 5, at 97-125. 
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instances.  However, the contribution of each singer would have been always 
minimal, if compared to the entire stock of formulary diction.14 
The poetic formulary of the Iliad and Odyssey resulted from a continuous 
process of imitation of an original pattern.  The creation, use, and survival of epic 
formulae rested on resemblance and imitation across the generations of singers 
elaborating on the tradition.15  Chance was not guiding this process of imitation; 
rather, there was a precise model of creative production that borrowed and reused a 
tool to reach stylistic perfection.  Under this model, the capacity of taking that 
process of quality improvement to the extreme was recognized as creative genius.  
Homer was perhaps that creative genius.16  He was the aoidos who gave unity to a 
tradition.  He was the individual who sewed together a story that was fashioned 
collectively. 
[W]e should rather conceive that here is a poet who marked his works with 
genius not because he was able to model the words on his own thoughts, but 
because he was able to make use of traditional words and expressions.  For 
us to recognize a renunciation of this sort demands a tremendous effort of 
imagination. . . . It is not easy to put aside the literary conventions of one’s 
own era in favour of those of another.17 
This way, the Iliad and the Odyssey would appear to be the final result of an 
open model of collaborative and cumulative creativity that spanned centuries.  As 
Professor Gregory Nagy noted, “the evolution of the fixed texts that we know as the 
Iliad and Odyssey may be envisaged as a cumulative process, entailing countless 
instances of composition/performance in a tradition that is becoming streamlined into 
an increasingly rigid form as a result of ever-increasing proliferation.”18  
The investigation of one of the most influential works of Western culture leads to 
a very different perception of creativity than the one we are currently accustomed to 
accepting.  This ancient model of creativity departs considerably from the modern 
mechanics, at least those crystalized in the legal system in force.  In oral poetry, any 
individual work is ceaselessly reworked and modified.  Creativity is the act of 
blending together individual contributions; it is the act of the “sewer of songs.”  In 
modern eyes, this may very much resemble an act of plagiarism.  Milman Parry was 
aware of the contradiction when crafting his theory, and commented: 
But in practice the oral poet by no means limits his borrowing to the single 
formula; rather he uses whole passages which he has heard.  This is, 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 See PARRY, supra note 8, at 331. 
15 Id. at 197. 
16 See DE VRIES, supra note 4, at 10–11 (sustaining the view that the unity of the Iliad and the 
Odyssey was the work of Homer after all, and noting that “Homer is the crowning end of a long 
development”). 
17 PARRY, supra note 8, at 144–45. 
18 GREGORY NAGY, THE BEST OF THE ACHAEANS:  CONCEPTS OF THE HERO IN ARCHAIC GREEK 
POETRY (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1999); see also JOHN M. FOLEY, Traditional Oral Epic:  The 
Odyssey, Beowulf, and the Serbo-Croatian Return Song 20–31 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1990) [FOLEY, 
TRADITIONAL ORAL EPIC]. 
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indeed, his whole art: to make a poem like the poems he has heard.  I know 
only too well that this is sure to suggest the thought of plagiarism to those 
not familiar with oral poetry, but it must be understood above all that 
plagiarism is not possible in traditional literature.  One oral poet is better 
than another not because he has by himself found a more striking way of 
expressing his own thought but because he has been better able to make 
use of the tradition.19 
It is straightforward that oral-formulaic theory may work towards the de-
construction of the myth of original creativity, dear to modern Western society.  
Arnold Hauser noted the distance and the irreconcilable tension of the Homeric idea 
of creativity with the romantic ideal of artistry and authorship.  The Homeric works 
would be construed as products of collective genius as opposed to the romantic idea of 
individual genius. 
It upsets all romantic conceptions of the nature of art and the artist—
conceptions which are the very foundation of nineteenth-century aesthetics 
—to have to think of the Homeric epics, in all their perfections, as being the 
product neither of individual nor of folk poetry, but, on the contrary, as an 
anonymous artistic product of many elegant courtiers and learned literary 
gentlemen, in which the boundaries between the work of different 
personalities, schools and generations have become obliterated.20 
If all his language is formulaic, Homer, the definitive poet, was no more than a 
“spokesman for a tradition.”21  Albert Lord backed up the idea by noting that in oral 
poetry there is no origin, but only a process of development, refinement, and 
elaboration.  In oral poetry and Homeric poems, therefore, “the words ‘author’ and 
‘original’ have either no meaning at all . . . or a meaning quite different from the one 
usually assigned to them.”22  Oral-formulaic theories encountered great suspicion for 
threatening the idea of poetic original greatness of Homer.  The traditional formulary 
nature of Homer’s language has seemed to cast an aspersion on Homer’s inventive 
power, as described by Theodore Wade-Gery:  
                                                                                                                                                 
19 PARRY, supra note 8, at 334. 
20 ARNOLD HAUSER, THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF ART 57 (Routledge 1999). 
21 BARRY B. POWELL, HOMER 20 (Blackwell Publ’g 2004).  Powell wrote: 
 
If all Homer is formulaic, the proof of Homer’s “orality,” where is the brilliance 
and poetic genius of the divine Homer?  The followers of Wolf had removed Homer 
from the equation:  no more did Homer “write” the Iliad than Moses “wrote” 
Genesis.  Parry restored Homer and disproved the redacted text, but in so doing 
seemed just as much to take away Homer’s opportunity for creativity and 
greatness.  If all his language is traditional, consisting of formulas and formulaic 
expressions, then was not Homer more spokesman for a tradition than a creator 
in his own right? 
 
Id. 
22 LORD, supra note 13, at 101. 
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The most important assault made on Homer’s creativeness in recent years 
is the work of Milman Parry, who may be called the Darwin of Homeric 
studies.  As Darwin seemed to many to have removed the finger of God from 
the creation of the world and of man, so Milman Parry has seemed to some 
to remove the creative poet from the Iliad and Odyssey.23 
The comparison that Wade-Gery made with the Darwinian theories hinted to an 
additional feature of past approaches to creativity.  The development and later 
textualization of the Homeric tradition belongs to an evolutionary model. 24   The 
cultural artifact did not come to life as a perfect final product.  Instead, it underwent 
a prolonged process of evolution.   
The evolutionary model is common to all epic poetry and originated from the 
same mechanics governing the development of the oral tradition.  In this regard, the 
oral-formulaic theory is “a fundamental theoretical fulcrum in the study and 
comparison of numerous other ancient, medieval, and even contemporary 
literatures.”25  The Hittite epic poem Gilgamesh is one of the earliest examples.26  As 
an additional example, an evolutionary model is applicable also to the Indian 
Sanskrit oral epic tradition.27  The Mahabharata, a monumental work roughly eight 
times the size of the Iliad and Odyssey, and the smaller Ramayana were developed in 
their final forms across many centuries.  The formative period of the Mahabharata is 
estimated from 400 B.C.  to 400 A.D., and that of the Ramayana from 200 B.C.  to 200 
A.D.  Again, the Bible and Biblical materials have oral roots that make them the 
final textualization of a collaborative and evolutionary creative model.28  The Koran 
has arguably the same oral origin.  The Arabic term Qur’an, and the verb from which 
it was taken qu’ran, originally meant “vocalized recitation.”29 
B. Virgil and Macrobius’ Testimony:  From Platonic Mimesis to Roman Imitatio 
Once Homer left the witness box, Macrobius came in to support Chuck D’s case 
and he spoke on behalf of Virgil as well.  Macrobius was the author of the Saturnalia, 
written in the fifth century A.D., and which crystallized the principles of Roman 
aesthetics.  Macrobius’ Saturnalia heavily influenced later medieval literature.  It 
laid down the fundamental principles of literary description as an exercise of 
                                                                                                                                                 
23 HENRY T. WADE-GERY, THE POET OF THE ILIAD 38–39 (1952). 
24 See NAGY, supra note 4, at 41–43 (positing at least five distinct consecutive periods of 
Homeric transmission). 
25 FOLEY, ORAL-FORMULAIC THEORY, supra note 7, at 12. 
26 See GEOFFREY S. KIRK, THE SONGS OF HOMER 56–57 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005). 
27 See NAGY, supra note 4, at 44–58; STUART H. BLACKBURN, ORAL EPICS IN INDIA (Univ. of 
Cal. Press 1989); John Brockington, The Textualization of the Sanskrit Epics, in TEXTUALIZATION OF 
ORAL EPIC 39 (Lauri Honko ed., 2000); DE VRIES, supra note 4, at 99–110. 
28  See generally FOLEY, ORAL FORMULAIC THEORY, supra note 7, at 51, 71; HENRI-JEAN 
MARTIN, THE HISTORY AND POWER OF WRITING 104 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1994); Robert C. Culley, 
Oral Tradition and the Old Testament:  Some Recent Discussion, in ORAL TRADITION AND OLD 
TESTAMENT STUDIES 1–33 (Robert C. Culley ed., 1976); Robert C. Culley, Oral-Formulaic Language 
in the Biblical Psalms, in 4 NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST SERIES (1967). 
29 See Culley, supra note 28, at 114-115. 
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imitation and emulation through invention, reordering, and different species of 
modification of previous models.30 
The Roman perception of creativity is far removed from the “modernist value 
system, which from the Romantic era onwards has valorized originality and artistic 
genius and, in consequence, denigrated copying.” 31   Copying, imitation, and 
emulation in ancient creativity was an art in its own right.32  In this respect, the 
“anxiety of influence” of modern authorship was inconceivable to the Roman way of 
thinking.33  In fact, Romans would have perceived the rejection of the influence of 
predecessors as “peculiar, perhaps even foolish.”34  At least in the literal context, the 
rationale for generalized borrowing and re-use in Latin creative tradition was 
explained by Seneca the Elder in the following terms:  “not for the sake of stealing, 
but of open borrowing, for the purpose of having it recognized.”35  A poet might 
borrow a motif from another poet so as to pay that poet a compliment and have the 
reader discover that tribute.  Henry Nettleship, renowned Virgilian scholar and 
Oxford professor of the nineteenth century, noted that in early imperial Rome “no 
sooner had a fine thought, phrase, or even rhythm been struck out by a poet, than 
[sic] it became, by common consent, the property of all subsequent writers.  To 
appropriate was not to commit a plagiarism, but to do honour to its inventor.”36  
Again, Nettleship pointed out that “to use a friend’s verses seems to have been 
regarded by the Roman poets as a compliment and a mark of affection.”37  This theme 
would later dominate medieval literature.38 
Leading Roman authors have openly spelled out the centrality of imitation of 
past works and models.  In particular, originality of theme or story was far less 
important than it is today.39  In contrast, Quintilian regarded imitation as a way to 
reach excellence: 
                                                                                                                                                 
30  See DOUGLAS KELLY, THE CONSPIRACY OF ALLUSION:  DESCRIPTION, REWRITING, AND 
AUTHORSHIP FROM MACROBIUS TO MEDIEVAL ROMANCE 36–78 (Koninklijke Brill NV 1999) 
(illustrating the rules of description in Macrobius’ Saturnalia, the stages of descriptions, and their 
influence on medieval writers and romances). 
31 Elaine K. Gazda, Beyond Copying:  Artistic Originality and Tradition, in THE ANCIENT ART 
OF EMULATION:  STUDIES IN ARTISTIC ORIGINALITY AND TRADITION FROM THE PRESENT TO 
CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY 2 (Elaine K. Gazda ed., Univ. of Mich. Press 2002). 
32 See generally id. 
33 See HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE:  A THEORY OF POETRY (Oxford Univ. 
Press, Inc. 1973). 
34 Gazda, supra note 31, at 11. 
35  Seneca the Elder, Suasoriae 3.7, as cited in GIAN BIAGIO CONTE, THE RHETORIC OF 
IMITATION:  GENRE AND POETIC MEMORY IN VIRGIL AND OTHER LATIN POETS 32 (Charles Segal ed., 
Cornell Univ. Press 1986). 
36  HENRY NETTLESHIP, LECTURES AND ESSAYS ON SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH LATIN 
LITERATURE AND SCHOLARSHIP 123 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2010) (1885). 
37 HENRY NETTLESHIP, ANCIENT LIVES OF VERGIL WITH AN ESSAY ON THE POEMS OF VERGIL IN 
CONNECTION WITH HIS LIFE AND TIMES 62 (Nabu Press 2011) (1879). 
38 See Jan M. Ziolkowski, The Highest Form of Compliment:  Imitatio in the Medieval Latin 
Culture, in POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES:  A FESTSCHRIFT FOR PETER DRONKE 293 
(John Marenbon ed., Koninklijke Brill NV 2001). 
39 See Katharina de la Durantaye, The Origins of the Protection of Literary Authorship in 
Ancient Rome, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 37, 70 (2007) (noting that, in this respect, Shakespeare’s 
Elizabethan creativity also resembled this character of Roman creativity). 
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[F]or there can be no doubt that in art no small portion of our task lies in 
imitation, since, although invention came first and is all-important, it is 
expedient to imitate whatever has been invented with success.  And it is a 
universal rule of life that we should wish to copy what we approve in 
others.40 
Imitation in Roman literature went hand in hand with the related search for 
excellence.  At least by the first century B.C., in the Rhetorica ad Herennium, 
Cicero’s Brutus and De Oratore, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ On Imitation, 
rhetorical doctrine put forward the conviction that imitation of great authors was the 
surest instrument for attaining excellence in creative endeavors.41  Roman authors 
build upon the ideas of Plato and Aristotle that dominated the ancient construction of 
aesthetics.  Plato, and Aristotle, in part, made imitation the general principle of art.42  
In Plato and Aristotle’s view, art was a mimesis of reality.  The Platonic emphasis on 
imitation naturally made copying and borrowing necessary instruments of creativity.  
The Platonic concept of artistic imitation deeply influenced Hellenistic and Roman 
aesthetic and justified the largely imitative and cumulative nature of ancient 
creativity.  The theory dominated most of our history of aesthetic and was discredited 
only under the influence of Romanticism, where the idea of Platonic imitation was 
regarded as anything more than “a systematic violation of art,” “depriving it of all its 
charms.”43 
In the Ars Poetica, Horace crystallized the idea that literary mimesis meant not 
only the imitation of nature, but also the imitation of literary precedents and 
models.44  According to modern studies, ancient Roman literature knew three forms 
of literary imitation—interpretatio, imitatio, and aemulatio.45  The interpretatio was 
the less original adaptation and coincided with the direct translation of one source.  
The imitatio was an adaptation that consisted in the borrowing of form, or content, or 
both from one or more renowned Greek sources.  The aemulatio, finally, was a form of 
creative rivalry.  Powerful examples are Virgil’s emulation of Homer’s epics and 
Horace’s emulation of Alcaeus’ lyrics.  Through interpretatio, imitatio, and aemulatio, 
the Romans created an entire body of literature and visual art referring to, borrowing 
from and drawing on Greek models.  The literary mimesis initially included 
                                                                                                                                                 
40 MARCUS FABIUS QUINTILIANUS, IV, THE INSTITUTIO ORATORIA §§ 10.2.1–10.2.2 (Harold E. 
Butler trans., 1922) (c. 35–100 C.E.); see also Ziolkowski, supra note 38, at 305. 
41 See Ziolkowski, supra note 38, at 300. 
42 See, e.g., Plato, Cratylus, in XII PLATO IN TWELVE VOLUMES 423cd (Harold N. Fowler trans., 
1921); Plato, Republic, in V–VI PLATO IN TWELVE VOLUMES 393c, 399a–c, 401a (Paul Shorey trans., 
1969); Plato, Laws, in X–XI PLATO IN TWELVE VOLUMES 655d, 668a–c, 795e (R G. Bury trans., 
1967); Aristotle, Poetics, in XXIII ARISTOTLE IN 23 VOLUMES 1448b (W. H. Fyfe trans., 1932). 
43 Otto Apelt, Platonische Aufsätze 68–70 (1912), as cited in WILLEM J. VERDENIUS, MIMESIS:  
PLATO’S DOCTRINE OF ARTISTIC IMITATION AND ITS MEANING TO US 1–2 (1972). 
44 See Quintus Horatius Flaccus, Ars Poetica, l. 19–134 (c. 18 B.C.E.), as cited in THE WORKS 
OF HORACE:  TRANSLATED LITERARY INTO ENGLISH PROSE 306 (Christopher Smart trans., 1863); 
Ziolkowski, supra note 38, at 298. 
45 See Arno Reiff, Interpretatio, imitatio, aemulatio:  Begriff und Vorstellung literarischer 
Abhängigkeit bei den Römern (1959) (Ph.D. Dissertation, Universitat Köln); JAMES HARDIN, 
TRANSLATION AND TRANSLATION THEORY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY GERMANY 59–60 (1992); 
Ziolkowski, supra note 38, at 300. 
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exclusively Greek literature, though later was extended to a select group of Roman 
authors.  In the early stage of Roman literature, there were great presumptions that 
the majority of the dramatic writings that appeared in Rome were in great part 
based upon Greek originals.46  As the assumptions go, Latin poets of the fourth and 
third century were translating the Greeks, or at least paraphrasing them.  Ennius, 
often referred to as the father of Latin literature, was said to have generally 
simplified and amplified the plays of Euripides.47  Discussing Ennius’ Medea, Cicero 
stated that it was a “word for word” translation of the Medea of Euripides.48  Again, 
as mentioned by Cicero, The Young Comrades of Caecilius, or Terence’s Maid of 
Andros were adaptations, or perhaps bodily translations, of two earlier comedies 
from Menander.49 
Virtually all ancient and medieval writing were based on the imitation of 
traditional paradigms and models. 50   Horace’s ausus idem—daring to rewrite—
characterized most of the ancient and medieval literary experience.51  The art of 
rewriting—or description—is illustrated by Macrobius’ Saturnalia in minute detail.52  
Macrobius gave scholastic substance to Horace’s literary challenge by providing his 
readers with an articulated description of the literary relationship between auctor 
and imitator—author and rewriter.  In the Saturnalia, Macrobius provided a full 
account of Virgil’s borrowings.53  Macrobius quoted “actual lines of Homer which 
Virgil has translated almost word for word,”54 then decided “to go through the Aeneid 
from the beginning, book by book.” 55   Later, Macrobius “tells us of the Virgil’s 
borrowings from the old writers of Rome as well.”56  Macrobius goes on for more than 
ten chapters detailing instances of verbatim duplications, borrowings, translations 
and rewritings of the Homeric original and Roman authors, such as Ennius, 
Lucretius, Furius, Lucilius, Pacuvius, Naevius, Sueius, Varius, Accius and 
                                                                                                                                                 
46 See GEORGE H. PUTNAM, AUTHORS AND THEIR PUBLIC IN ANCIENT TIMES 177–78 (Kessinger 
Publ’g 2003) (1893). 
47 See GEORGE A. SIMCOX, I, HISTORY OF LATIN LITERATURE FROM ENNIUS TO BOETHIUS 34 
(Kennikat Press 1971) (1883). 
48 See MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, I, DE FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM 4 (1914). 
49 Id. at 4–5. 
50 Modern aesthetics standards have departed considerably from this arrangement.  Since the 
end of the eighteenth century the status of imitation has been questionable.  In a classic article on 
imitation in antiquity, Richard McKeon declared that “[t]he term ‘imitation’ is not prominent in the 
vocabulary of criticism today.  In such use as it still has, it serves to segregate the bad from the good 
in art.”  Richard McKeon, Literary Criticism and the Concept of Imitation in Antiquity, 34 MOD. 
PHILOLOGY 1 (1936), reprinted in CRITICS AND CRITICISM:  ANCIENT AND MODERN 147 (Ronald S. 
Crane ed., 1952).  To the sensibility of the moderns, “[i]mitation conflicts with ideals (sometimes 
illusory) of originality, spontaneity, innovation, unconventionality, improvisation, self-expression, 
and individuality that have held sway since Romanticism.”  Ziolkowski, supra note 38, at 296. 
51  Flaccus, supra note 44, at 323 ll. 240–42 (“Ex noto fictum carmen sequare, ut sibi 
quivis/Speret idem, sudet multum frustaque laboret/Ausus idem [I would execute a fiction taken 
from a well-known story, that anybody might entertain hopes of doing the same thing; but, on trial, 
should sweat and labor in vain]”). 
52 See MACROBIUS, THE SATURNALIA (1969). 
53 Id. at 290–343 (describing Virgil’s adaptations of Latin writers); see also KELLY, supra note 
30, at 58. 
54 MACROBIUS, supra note 52, at 290. 
55 Id. at 295. 
56 Id. at 385. 
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Catullus.57  In connection with the enumeration of Virgil’s borrowings, Macrobius 
sketched out the principles of imitatio and aemulatio that governed ancient literary 
creativity by noting: 
[T]he reward of ones’ reading is to seek to rival what meet with one’s 
approval in the work of others and by a happy turn to convert to some use of 
one’s own the expressions one especially admires there.  For this is what 
our writers have often done, borrowing both from one another and from the 
Greeks; and this is what the greatest of the Greeks often did among 
themselves . . . .  But if all poets and other writes are allowed to act among 
themselves in this way, as partners holding in common [haec societas et 
rerum communio], what right has anyone to accuse Virgil of dishonesty, if 
he has borrowed from his predecessors to embellish his poems?58 
As Macrobius had shown, imitation and borrowing as championed by Virgil 
strengthened their status as instruments of literary and artistic excellence.  If the 
poet, to be regarded as the ultimate model, had himself heavily imitated and 
rewritten his predecessors, then creativity could only progress through imitation.  
This was the lesson that the ancients, Virgil and Macrobius, left to powerfully 
resound for the following millennium.  Large parts of the greatest and most 
representative works produced in Latin, French, and English in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries were rewrites, following Macrobius’ principles of description.59 
C. Chaucer’s Testimony:  Social Textuality and Auctoritas 
Now, enter Geoffrey Chaucer (1343–1400), the father of English literature.  
Chaucer expressed the common medieval attitude that almost everything there is to 
say has been said.60  Nullumst iam dictum quod non sit dictum prius, Terence firstly 
noted.61   In the Prologue to The Canterbury Tales and other passages, Chaucer 
presented himself as a mere compiler or translator, who was not the auctor of the 
books he made and who was not responsible for the materials he used.62   
                                                                                                                                                 
57 Id. at 290–343, 386–409. 
58 Id. at 385–86. 
59 KELLY, supra note 30, at xiii. 
60  See JOHN A. BURROW, MEDIEVAL WRITERS AND THEIR WORKS:  MIDDLE ENGLISH 
LITERATURE AND ITS BACKGROUND, 1100–1500 34 (1982). 
61 Publius Terentius Afer, Eunuchus l. 41 (c. 161 B.C.E.), in I TERENCE:  THE LADY OF ANDROS, 
THE SELF-TORMENTOR, THE EUNUCH 238 (John Sargeaunt trans., 1918) (“In fact nothing is said 
that has not been said before.  So you should recognize facts and pardon new playwrights if they 
present what their predecessors presented before them.”). 
62 See BENNETT, supra note 3, at 42; THE IDEA OF THE VERNACULAR:  AN ANTHOLOGY OF 
MIDDLE ENGLISH LITERARY THEORY 1280–1520 (Jocelyn Wogan-Browne et al. eds., 1999) 
[hereinafter THE IDEA OF THE VERNACULAR]; BURROW, supra note 60, at 36–37; SEBASTIAN COXON, 
THE PRESENTATION OF AUTHORSHIP IN MEDIEVAL GERMAN NARRATIVE LITERATURE 1220–290 
(2001) (mentioning that many well-known German authors of the mid-twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries often professed their works to be translations of French and Latin source texts). 
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The disclaimer may echo, perhaps, that of Lucian of Samosata.  He claimed a 
millennium earlier his role as a mere mouthpiece of the Muses.   He had Hesiod say 
in one imaginary dialogue with the poet of old:  “I might tell you that not one of my 
poems is my own work; all is the Muses’, and to them I might refer you for all that 
has been said and left unsaid.”63  In the Far East, Confucius would equally note that 
“I transmit rather than create; I believe in and love the Ancients.”64  For Chaucer, 
therefore, the act of writing was represented by the metaphor of gleaning the harvest 
of poetry reaped by others: 
For wel I wot that folk han here-beforn/Of Makyng ropen [reaped the 
harvest of poetry], and lad away the corn;/and I come after, glenynge here 
and there/And am ful glad if I may fynde an ere/Of any goodly word that 
they han left.65 
The medieval author “is configured as part of a continuum that extends from the 
‘simple’ process of copying at one end to the act of ‘original’ composition at the 
other.” 66   In a well-known commentary on the making of books, the thirteenth-
century monk Saint Bonaventure listed four types of makers of books: 
There are four ways of making a book.  Sometimes a man writes others’ 
words, adding nothing and changing nothing; he is simply called a scribe 
[scriptor].  Sometimes a man writes others’ words, putting together 
passages which are not his own; and he is called a compiler [compilator].  
Sometimes a man writes both others’ words and his own, but with the 
others’ words in prime place and his own added only for purposes of 
clarification; and he is called not an author but a commentator 
[commentator].  Sometimes a man writes both his own words and others’, 
but with his own in prime place and others’ added only for purposes of 
confirmation; and he should be called an author [auctor].67 
In Bonaventure’s eyes, compiling, translating, commenting, or even simply 
transcribing the works of great authors was a worthy aim for a medieval writer.68  
Even the lower functions on Bonaventure’s scale were marked with the fabric of 
authorship.  Bonaventure’s overlapping roles in the chain of creative literary 
production blurred the contours of medieval authorship, reinforcing its social matrix.  
                                                                                                                                                 
63 Lucian of Samosata, Dialogue with Hesiod (c. 160–64 C.E.), in THE WORKS OF LUCIAN OF 
SAMOSATA 568 (Henry W. Fowler & Francis G. Fowler trans., 2007). 
64 Carla Hesse, The Rise of Intellectual Property, 700 B.C.--A.D. 2000: An Idea in the Balance, 
131.2 Daedalus 26, 26 (2002) (reporting that the saying of Confucius was included in the Lun-Yii, or 
Analects, compiled in China in the fifth century B.C.E.). 
65 Geoffrey Chaucer, The Legend of Good Women, Prologue, G version 61–5, as cited in JOHN A. 
BURROW, MEDIEVAL WRITERS AND THEIR WORKS:  MIDDLE ENGLISH LITERATURE AND ITS 
BACKGROUND, 1100–1500 31 (1982). 
66 BENNETT, supra note 3, at 39. 
67 Bonaventure, In Primum Librum Sentetiarum, proem, quaest. iv, in OPERA 14 (Quaraccchi 
ed., 1882), as cited in BURROW, supra note 60, at 31. 
68 See id. at 34. 
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Instances of so-called “scribal interpolation” were common in the case of Chaucer’s 
Canterbury Tales, which was left in a fragmentary state by Chaucer.  Those 
concerned with the transmission of the text spuriously added prologues, epilogues, or 
tales.69 
The poetic versification in the manuscript tradition is a major example of the 
social history of medieval and renaissance poetic texts.  Derek Pearsall noted that in 
the context of late medieval poetic versification, the poetic text is an instrument to be 
used and not merely read: 
Poems are borrowed and their allusions to date and circumstances changed 
so as to fit a new occasion.  Verses are incorporated into love-
letters . . . stanzas from the common stock are interlaced and reworked; 
simple pieces, including popular songs, are adapted for more ostentatious 
purposes; famous opening stanzas and striking first lines are pressed into 
service again and again to lunch new poems.70 
Pearsall elaborated that the poems in the medieval manuscript tradition “are no 
one’s property and the whole notion of authorship is in a way irrelevant.”71  The work 
tended to easily escape authorial control and enter into a world of easy appropriation 
and alteration.  Arthur Marotti spoke of social textuality, malleability, and textual 
instability in manuscript culture.72  What is viewed as corruption from a modern 
author-centered perspective was viewed in the manuscript culture as transformative 
elaboration, generally accepted and often welcomed by the original author.  In this 
regard, Marotti noted that “[i]n fact, some authors expected and even welcomed the 
changes that recipients of their works brought to them, acknowledging the possibility 
that modern textual scholarship has been reluctant to admit, that text might 
(accidentally or deliberately) be improved by individuals other than the original 
writers.”73 
The special connection between God and creativity further cements the 
communal and participatory nature of medieval authorship.  In Medieval Theory of 
Authorship, Alastair Minnis explained that the medieval auctor ultimately took his 
authority from God.74  The nature of creativity and authorship is reprocessed in 
medieval terms under the light of the concept of authority.  The author was seen as 
receiving auctoritas—authority—to make authoritative statements directly from 
God.75  The author was to be respected, believed, and finally quoted, extracted, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
69 Id. at 32. 
70  DEREK PEARSALL, OLD AND MIDDLE ENGLISH POETRY 221 (1977); see also RICHARD L. 
GREENE, THE EARLY ENGLISH CAROLS cxxxi (Clarendon Press 1935) (emphasizing the similar 
plasticity of the text of carols). 
71 PEARSALL, supra note 70, at 221. 
72 ARTHUR F. MAROTTI, MANUSCRIPT, PRINT, AND THE ENGLISH RENAISSANCE LYRIC 135–59 
(Cornell Univ. Press 1995). 
73 Id. at 136. 
74  See ALASTAIR J. MINNIS, MEDIEVAL THEORY OF AUTHORSHIP:  SCHOLASTIC LITERARY 
ATTITUDES IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 10 (1988); Andrew Hope, Plagiarizing the Word of God:  
Tyndale between Moore and Joye, in PLAGIARISM IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 93–94 (Paulina 
Kewes ed., 2003) [hereinafter PLAGIARISM IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND]. 
75 See MINNIS, supra note 74, at 10. 
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imitated.76  As a consequence of the special relation between creativity, authority, 
and God, the medieval evolution of the classical concept of “imitatio rested on a 
premise that reached far beyond the Classics. It joined authors ultimately with God, 
the ultimate source of all creativity and the highest object of imitation.”77  In this 
sense, in the Middle Ages, plagiarism might have been interpreted as “giving to the 
people what God has given to the author.”78 
Not surprisingly, in connection with this creative process joining the author with 
God’s auctoritas, and therefore with the surrounding community, “writers gain 
authority less by their originality than by their contribution to an ongoing 
tradition.”79  As a result, authorship did not entail verbal inventiveness but rather its 
opposite.80  The Middle Ages coined the very word text out of a textile metaphor to 
recognize that many medieval writings “are fabrics that incorporate fibers from 
earlier writings and preceding traditions.”81  The task of vernacular writers—and 
medieval authors in general—was perceived as that of understanding, interpreting 
and elaborating past authorities, rather than competing with them.82  The common 
character of both the scribe and the author was to participate in an ongoing 
intellectual tradition connected to past authorities.  In this sense, medieval 
authorship “was more likely to be understood as participation in an intellectually and 
morally authoritative tradition, within which . . . a writer might fill one of several 
roles, copying, modifying and translating, as well as composing.”83 
In the Middle Ages, creativity seemed to entail principally a process of slow 
augmentation of “the knowledge and wisdom of humanity.”84   It may be loosely 
identified with the medieval idea of authority.  Creativity was an inclusive medium.  
The medieval author was a cell of a breathing organism, the medieval community, 
and creativity was an instrument to strengthen the appurtenance of the author to 
the community.  Thus in the medieval period, creativity was largely conceived as a 
participatory process, as opposed to the modern romantic individualistic perception.  
Creativity in the Romantic sense is an exclusive medium, empowering the individual 
to stand out from the community.  But as to be discussed later, the idea of inclusivity 
in the discourse over creativity has regained momentum.  There is now more 
emphasis on community, participation, and mass and cumulative production in the 
digital environment. 
                                                                                                                                                 
76 Id. at 5. 
77 Ziolkowski, supra note 38, at 302–03. 
78 Natalie Zemon Davis, Beyond the Market:  Books as Gifts in Sixteenth-Century France, 
33 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 69, 87 (1983). 
79 THE IDEA OF THE VERNACULAR, supra note 62, at 5. 
80  See Donald Pease, Author, in CRITICAL TERMS OF LITERARY STUDY 105–06 (Frank 
Lentricchia & Thomas McLaughlin eds., 1990); BENNETT, supra note 3, at 40. 
81  Pease, supra note 80, at 292; see generally, on the textile metaphor, ERNEST ROBERT 
CURTIUS, EUROPEAN LITERATURE AND THE LATIN MIDDLE AGES (1991); Jan M. Ziolkowski, Text and 
Textuality, Medieval and Modern, in DER UNFESTE TEXT:  PERSPEKTIVEN AUFEINEN LITERATUR-UND 
KULTURWISSENSCHAFTLICHEN LEITBEGRIFF 109–31 (Barbara Sabel and André Bucher eds., 2001). 
82 See BENNETT, supra note 3, at 40. 
83 THE IDEA OF THE VERNACULAR, supra note 62, at 4–5. 
84 See BURROW, supra note 60, at 34. 
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D. Anon’s Testimony:  Anonymity and Mouvance 
After Chaucer, it came the time for Anon to speak.  Being the selfless medieval 
minstrel, he or she spoke with the words of Virginia Woolf, who evoked Anon in an 
unfinished literary history.85 
The voice that broke the silence of the forest was the voice of Anon.  Some 
one heard the song and remembered it for it was later written down, 
beautifully, on parchment.  Thus the singer had his audience, but the 
audience was so little interested in his name that he never thought to give 
it.  The audience was itself the singer; “Terly, terlow” they sang; and “By, by 
lullaby” filling in the pauses, helping out with a chorus.  Every body shared 
in the emotion of Anon’s song, and supplied the story.  [Anon] is 
the . . . common voice singing out of doors.86 
Anon, Virginia Woolf continued, “was a simple singer, lifting a song or a story 
from other peoples lips, and letting the audience join in the chorus.”87  Anon singing 
was a community effort.  Anon sang with and for the community.  The image of Anon 
symbolized the idea that early authorship was not an individual activity.  In this 
sense, Woolf, and later other scholars such as Margaret Ezell, read medieval 
creativity in terms of social authorship.88 
In evoking Anon, Woolf expanded the perception of creativity to a nameless 
domain, in which individual identity cannot satisfactorily describe authorship.  Anon 
was anonymous.  Writing on the anonymous nature of medieval creativity, Woolf 
noted:  
Anonymity was a great possession.  It gave the early writing an 
impersonality, a generality.  It gave us the ballads; it gave us the songs.  It 
allowed us to know nothing of the writer:  and so to concentrate upon his 
song.  Anon had great privileges.  He was not responsible.  He was not self 
conscious.  He can borrow.  He can repeat.  He can say what every one 
feels.89 
Anonymity became the most substantial sign of a social mode of literary 
production.  Foucault elaborated on the same point by noting that the “‘author-
function’ is not universal or constant in all discourse” and “the same types of texts 
have not always required authors; there was a time when those texts which we now 
call ‘literary’ (stories, folk tales, epics, and tragedies) were accepted, circulated and 
valorized without any questions about the identity of their author.”90 
                                                                                                                                                 
85 See Brenda R. Silver, Anon and the Reader:  Virginia Woolf Last Essays, 25 TWENTIETH 
CENTURY LIT. 356, 382 (1979). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 See generally MARGARET EZELL, SOCIAL AUTHORSHIP AND THE ADVENT OF PRINT (1999). 
89 Silver, supra note 85, at 397. 
90  Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE:  
SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS 124–25 (Donald Bouchard ed., 1977).  Foucault also explains 
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Anon and Homer shared the same nature.  The same mechanics of creativity and 
authorship applied repeatedly across two millennia of human literary production.  
Bards, minstrels, jongleurs, and troubadours played the same role of the aoidoi of 
ancient Greece.91  Whether impersonating a wandering musician or a courtly poet, 
Anon developed and refined a stock of vernacular oral-formulaic tradition across the 
centuries.92  The final result of this cumulative and collaborative creative effort was a 
monumental achievement.  Medieval epics—that spanned from Beowulf to the 
Chanson de geste and romance literature, or again from the Nibelungenlied93 to the 
Finnish Kalevala, the Old Norse and Icelandic sagas94—sprung beautifully, as the 
Iliad and the Odyssey before them, from the oral tradition and the endless reworking 
of patterns, characters, and themes by a nameless multitude of singers of songs.  
Like Homer, the fictional Anon was one and all of those singers.  He was the singer of 
the vernacular tradition. 
Cumulative oral production served as a matrix of the entire Western medieval 
epic.  Referring specifically to the Nibelungen epic, Henri-Jean Martin sketched the 
development of this powerful continuum by noting: 
As it had happen long before with the Homeric poems, more recently with 
the Chanson de Roland, and, to a certain extent, with the Arthurian 
romances, when the Nibelungen epic was set down in writing it resulted in 
a masterwork that was something like a testament that passed on a legacy 
of oral traditions whose days were numbered.95 
Nancy Bradbury nicely summarized the fusion of oral and written traditions in 
medieval epic and popular literature with the epithet “writing aloud.”96  Performance 
and writing of the medieval romance developed together in tight connection, so that 
“the two traditions existed in a symbiotic relationship” and “clerks and 
minstrels . . . often borrowed each other’s plumage.”97  The fluidity of traditional epic 
and popular literature derived from the symbiotic relationship between oral and 
written tradition.  In this respect, Paul Zumthor noted that the medieval work often 
                                                                                                                                                 
that any concept of appropriation of a text cannot be used to describe the relationship between a 
medieval author and a medieval text:  appropriation of a text, as Foucault explained, is a form of 
property unknown in the Middle Ages.  Id. 
91 See HAUSER, supra note 20, at 199–210 (discussing generally artistic figures and their social 
and creative role). 
92  See, e.g., Francis P. Magoun, The Oral-Formulaic Character of Anglo-Saxon Narrative 
Poetry, 28 SPECULUM 446, 446 (1953); LORD, supra note 13, at 36, 198; FOLEY, TRADITIONAL ORAL 
EPIC, supra note 18, at 33. 
93  See Lauri Honko, Text as Process and Practice:  the Textualization of Oral Epics, in 
TEXTUALIZATION OF ORAL EPIC 39 (Lauri Honko ed., 2000). 
94 See, e.g., Stephen A. Mitchell, The Sagaman and Oral Literature:  The Icelandic Traditions 
of Hjörleifr inn kvensami and Geirmundr heljarskinn, in COMPARATIVE RESEARCH ON ORAL 
TRADITIONS:  A MEMORIAL FOR MILMAN PARRY (John M. Foley ed., 1987). 
95 MARTIN, supra note 28, at 163. 
96 See NANCY M. BRADBURY, WRITING ALOUD:  STORYTELLING IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 
(1988); COXON, supra note 62, at 146, 173 (confirming that a “strong oral tradition continued to 
exert influence on written heroic literature” in Germany as well). 
97 VITZ, supra note 96, at 46. 
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“has no authentic text properly speaking,” but was “constituted by an abstract 
scheme, materialized in an unstable way from manuscript to manuscript, from 
performance to performance.” 98   The mouvance, as Zumthor termed it, was the 
defining character of the medieval text, which “was generally presumed . . . to be 
subject to . . . reinterpretation in the light of a new rnatiere, new understanding, new 
intentions, or a new audience or patron.”99 
As an effect of the merging between oral and written tradition, the mouvance 
was strongly correlated with the well-defined narrative units of the pre-modern 
popular culture.  As Peter Burke argued, “folksongs and folktales, popular plays and 
popular prints all need to be seen as combinations of elementary forms, permutations 
of elements which are more or less ready-made.”100  The episodic quality of pre-
modern popular culture boosted a process of creative recombination that 
characterized a large chunk of the history of popular culture. The secret of the 
“proliferativeness” of traditional pre-modern narrative lay in the idea that “[e]very 
story is constituted of many smaller stories or potential stories,” because at the 
intersection of each unit was situated the possibility of new stories, retellings and 
remixing of the old.101 
E. Chrétien de Troyes’ Testimony:  Romance Literature and the Art of Rewriting 
Chrétien de Troyes, the great star of the romance tradition, also came in to 
support Chuck D’s case and continued from where Anon had left off.  Chrétien was 
the master of the art of rewriting.  The art of rewriting, principles of which 
Macrobius’ Saturnalia illustrated to medieval authors, characterized most of the 
medieval romance literature.  Medieval Romances rewrote their predecessors and, as 
Marie de France would say, they added “their own meaning to make the book 
better.” 102   As Douglas Kelly noted in The Conspiracy of Allusion:  Description, 
Rewriting, and Authorship from Macrobius to Medieval Romance, “rewriting . . . is 
the sphere within which medieval writers in the scholastic tradition sought and 
achieved originality.”103 
Tightly connected to the mouvance and episodic nature of medieval text, the 
rewritings were created by bringing together different versions or episodes of the 
legend to form new wholes.  For example, Martin Gosman noted that all of the 
versions of the Romance d’Alixandre can be described as a phenomenon of permanent 
rewriting.104  In the case of the Alexander’s tale, the “wonders” section was “full of 
                                                                                                                                                 
98 PAUL ZUMTHOR, SPEAKING OF THE MIDDLE AGES 96 (1986) (describing this phenomenon as 
“mouvance”). 
99 DOUGLAS KELLY, THE ART OF MEDIEVAL FRENCH ROMANCE 68 (1992). 
100 PETER BURKE, POPULAR CULTURE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 124 (1978). 
101 KARL KROEBER, RETELLING/REREADING:  THE FATE OF STORYTELLING IN MODERN TIMES 78 
(1992); see also BRADBURY, supra note 96, at 4. 
102 MARIE DE FRANCE, LAIS, at Prologue l. 16. 
103 KELLY, supra note 30, at xiii. 
104 Martin Gosman, Le ‘Roman d’Alixandre’ et ses versions du XII siècle:  une rèècriture 
permanente, 13 BIEN DIRE ET BIEN APRANDRE 7 (1996). 
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fossilized reminders of older stories and enticing kernels of future stories.”105  The 
next teller would pick them up or drop them as irrelevant, according to the 
environment in which the new retelling was to be told.  Inserting and adapting 
antecedent material into the new work formed the amalgamation of the different 
versions of the legend of Alexander.  Pieces from vernacular lyric and other genres 
were inserted into romance narrative.  A new work was created from the adaption 
and development of those borrowed elements through a bele conjointure—the 
blending of matters that are aesthetically pleasing and meaningful. 106   The 
phenomenon of romance conjointure is thus described “as a montage or even a 
collage.”107 
As earlier anticipated when discussing Saint Bonaventure’s vision of authorship, 
in ancient and medieval creativity, the line between author and rewriter was often 
blurred.  The roles were often interchangeable.  For Macrobius, Virgil was a 
consummate, and sublime, rewriter of Homer and other earlier Roman authors.108  
Virgil himself became an author in its full sense when he was imitated and 
rewritten.  Again, the author of the medieval Roman d’Eneas was an imitator of 
Virgil, but also an intermediary auctor for Erec et Enide of Chrétien de Troyes, who 
was himself therefore a rewriter of the Roman d’Eneas and many other Latin, French 
and Celtic models and an auctor for the writers who followed him, especially the 
continuators of his romance of Perceval.109  In a very circular way, imitation was the 
source of authority and made authority worth of being imitated.  Hitting this very 
point, John of Salisbury commented in the late twelfth century on Macrobius’ 
influence by noting that “[h]e succeeded in making those who imitated earlier writers 
themselves imitable.” 110   The recurrence of writing and rewriting generated a 
powerful creative force that created the millennial epic tradition. 
As Chrétien explained during his testimony, accretion, retelling, and re-
elaboration laid the foundations of the Arthurian Romance.  Roger Sherman Loomis, 
one of the foremost authorities on medieval and Arthurian literature, wrote in his 
most notable book Arthurian Tradition and Chrétien de Troyes:  “it appears that the 
Matiére de Bretagne is a cumulative creation.” 111  According to Loomis, the oral 
tradition ignited a long course of development at the end of which stands the 
Arthurian romance and Chrétien de Troyes’ works.  A similar process led to the 
development of the Homeric tales and Germanic legends, such as Beowulf and the 
Nibelungenlied.  Evocatively, Loomis describes the similar origin of these three forms 
of traditional literature by noting: 
The rhapsodes and their relation to “homer,” the scops and their relation to 
Beowulf, would offer close parallels to the Welsh cyvarwyddon and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
105 Id. at 164. 
106 Id. at 214. 
107 Id. 
108 See, e.g., MACROBIUS, supra note 52, at 290–343 (Macrobius “quot[ed] actual lines of Homer 
which Virgil has translated almost word for word.”). 
109 See KELLY, supra note 30, at 58, 171–212. 
110 John of Salisbury, Metalogicon I.24.84–85, as cited in KELLY, supra note 30, at 58, 171–212. 
111 ROGER S. LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN TRADITION AND CHRÉTIEN DE TROYES 38 (1961) [hereinafter 
LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN TRADITION]. 
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Breton conteurs and their relation to the work of Chrétien.  In all three 
cases the poet is the inheritor of an age old body of stories, set in far-off 
times and places, preserved for generations by itinerant reciters.112 
Welsh or Celtic legends first developed the story, and bards sang it from place to 
place.113  In the ninth century, the work of Nennius further shaped the story that was 
later solidified by Geoffrey of Monmouth in his twelfth-century Historia Regum 
Britanniae.114  Putting together some scanty oral and written sources, Geoffrey de 
Monmouth highly fictionalized the story of Arthur to the extent that even in the 
twelfth century he was denounced as a forger.115 Several years later, from Normandy, 
Worcestershire, and Provençe respectively, Wace, Layamon, and Chrétien de Troyes 
elaborated the story. In 1155, Wace simply adapted the Historia of Geoffrey in the 
first Arthurian Romance, the Roman de Brut.116 Layamon or Harley took up Wace’s 
French version and put it into English verse.117 By the end of the twelfth century, 
Chrétien reworked the Arthurian materials and characters, perhaps adding the story 
of the Grail himself or deriving it from an ancient manuscript received from his 
patron, as he claimed.118 Meanwhile, the characters of the Arthurian legend spread 
throughout Europe.119 In the early twelfth century, the story of Queen Guinevere 
featured on the tympanum of the Cathedral of Modena.120  It is a question whether 
these sculptures would have been seized and destroyed had Warner Bros. owned the 
rights in Geoffrey or Wace’s work. After all, Warner Bros. has brought a lawsuit 
against an Indian group constructing a giant replica of Harry Potter’s Hogwarts 
during a Hindu religious festival in Kolkata.121 
In the thirteenth century, the Arthurian cycle came to center on Lancelot and on 
the story of the Grail, as sketched out in Perceval, the last of Chretien’s Arthurian 
                                                                                                                                                 
112 Id. at 39. 
113 See DEREK ALBERT PEARSALL, ARTHURIAN ROMANCE:  A SHORT INTRODUCTION 3–6 (2003); 
ROGER S. LOOMIS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARTHURIAN ROMANCE 16–22 (2000) [hereinafter 
LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN ROMANCE]. 
114 See GEOFFREY DE MONMOUTH, HISTORIA REGUM BRITANNIAE (c. 1138) [THE HISTORY OF 
THE KINGS OF BRITTANY]; Françoise Le Saux & Peter Damian-Grint, The Arthur of the Chronicles, 
in THE ARTHUR OF THE FRENCH:  THE ARTHURIAN LEGEND IN MEDIEVAL FRENCH AND OCCITAN 
LITERATURE 93–96 (Glyn Sheridan Burgess & Karen Pratt eds., 2006) [hereinafter THE ARTHUR OF 
THE FRENCH]; PEARSALL, supra note 113, at 6–13; LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN ROMANCE, supra note 113, 
at 34–39. 
115 See MARTIN, supra note 28, at 162; PEARSALL, supra note 113, at 8 (noting that the Historia 
of Geoffrey was “an amazing feat of invention”). 
116 See Le Saux & Damian-Grint, supra note 114, at 96–101; PEARSALL, supra note 113, at 13–
15. 
117 See PEARSALL, supra note 113, at 16; LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN ROMANCE, supra note 113, at 40–
43. 
118 See MARTIN, supra note 28, at 162; LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN TRADITION, supra note 111, at 12–
24, 25–38 (discussing Chrétien sources at length throughout the book). 
119 LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN TRADITION, supra note 111, at 48–50. 
120 See MARTIN, supra note 28, at 162; PEARSALL, supra note 113, at 49 (noting that “subjects 
from Arthurian romance were also favorites throughout Europe in all forms of interior decoration, 
furnishings and objects d’art”). 
121 See Hindu Hogwarts Casts Bad Spell on Rowling, METRO (Oct. 12, 2007), http://metro.co.uk/
2007/10/12/hindu-hogwarts-casts-bad-spell-on-rowling-256573/. 
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romances.122  The romance of Perceval strikingly exemplifies the tradition of reuse, 
recurrence, and cumulative creativity in medieval romance literature.  At least four 
continuations followed the original Chrétien de Troyes’s Le Conte du Graal, typically 
designated as Perceval, written across a decade between 1181 and 1191.123  From the 
late twelfth century to circa 1250, an anonymous writer, Wauchier de Denain, 
Manessier, and Gerbert de Montreuil wrote the four continuations. Each text and 
rewriting took over where others left off by developing a theme mentioned in the 
earlier version or reinventing the role of a character or place.124 The many Grail 
romances that rewrote Chrétien’s seminal text, which originally appropriated that 
which was already written, should be considered as forming a coherent whole.125  In 
this sense, the Perceval saga should be seen as an expression of collective and 
collaborative authorship.126 
Indeed, the continuations were just one of the many responses generated by 
Chrétien’s works.  Robert de Boron would develop the symbolism of the Grail, first 
adumbrated by Chretien, in Joseph d’Arimathie and his own Perceval now lost.127  
The same author gave a life of his own to Merlin in a romance with the same title.128  
Again, the Elucidation and the Bliocadran are short early thirteenth-century 
prequels to Chretien’s Perceval.129 From Britain to France, the Arthurian romances 
soon reached Germany.  The Swiss priest Ulrich von Zatzikhoven translated and 
adapted Chretien’s Lancelot into the German verse romance Lanzelet, including the 
whereabouts of the hero’s childhood. 130   A few years later, rewriting Chretien’s 
Perceval, Wolfram von Eschenbach would come up with his own Parzival, one of the 
masterpieces of medieval Arthurian Romance.131 
                                                                                                                                                 
122 See FERDINAND LOT, ETUDE SUR LE LANCELOT EN PROSE (1954), as cited in MARTIN, supra 
note 28, at 162. 
123 See Matilda Tomaryn Bruckner, Authorial Relays:  Continuing Chrétien’s Conte du Graal, 
in THE MEDIEVAL AUTHOR IN MEDIEVAL FRENCH LITERATURE 13–28 (Virginie E. Greene ed., 2006) 
[hereinafter Bruckner, Authorial Relays]; MATILDA TOMARYN BRUCKNER, CHRÉTIEN CONTINUED:  A 
STUDY OF THE CONTE DU GRAAL AND ITS VERSE CONTINUATIONS (2009) [hereinafter BRUCKNER, 
CHRÉTIEN CONTINUED]; Rupert T. Pickens, Keith Busby, & Andrea M. Williams, Perceval and the 
Grail:  the Continuations, Robert de Boron and Perlesvaus, in THE ARTHUR OF THE FRENCH, supra 
note 114, at 93–96 (GLYN SHERIDAN BURGESS AND KAREN PRATT EDS., U. Wales Press 2006); 
PEARSALL, supra note 113, at 36–39. 
124 Bruckner, Authorial Relays, supra note 123, at 22.  It mentioned the role of the Mont 
Dolerous, which was one of the adventures announced at Arthur’s court before the knights disperse 
in search of the Grail in Chrétien’s romance.  Id. It was then reinvented in some of the 
continuations, marking the opening and closing moment of Wauchier’s continuation.  Id. 
125 Id. at 14, 18. 
126 Cf. id. at 17. 
127 See Bruckner, Authorial Relays, supra note 123, at 12; Pickens, Busby, & Williams, supra 
note 123, at 260–68; PEARSALL, supra note 113, at 40–41; LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN ROMANCE, supra 
note 113, at 114–19. 
128 See PEARSALL, supra note 113, at 40.  In fact, Boron’s Merlin was indebted to an earlier Vita 
Merlini by Geoffrey de Monmouth and his Historia.  See GEOFFREY DE MONMOUTH, THE LIFE OF 
MERLIN, VITA MERLINI (John Jay Parry trans., 2008); Le Saux & Damian-Grint, supra note 114, at 
95, 108 n.4; LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN ROMANCE supra note 113, at 39–40, 124–30. 
129 See Pickens, Busby, & Williams, supra note 123, at 215–21. 
130 See PEARSALL, supra note 113, at 50–51. 
131 Id. at 51; LOOMIS, ARTHURIAN ROMANCE, supra note 113, at 67–74. 
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Meanwhile, Arthurian verse romances were turned into prose romances.  At the 
beginning of the thirteenth century, clerical appropriation of the Arthurian and Grail 
themes with religious purposes emerged as well. They appeared in prose Grail-
romances, such as Perlesvaus and Didot Perceval.132  Between 1215 and 1230, the 
expanding mass of stories was gathered together into a single chronological cycle by 
numerous authors and compilers.  The “Vulgate” cycle of Arthurian prose romance, 
as this unifying work is known, includes the Prose Lancelot, its sequel the Queste del 
Saint Grail, and the Mort le roi Artu and its prequels Estoire del Saint Graal and 
Estoire de Merlin, partly derived from Robert de Boron’s works.133  The Vulgate Cycle 
of Arthurian Prose romances was re-written shortly after his composition by an 
author who combined it with themes derived from the prose Tristan,134 another hero 
that was now living a life on his own and whose story went through numerous 
adaptations, transformations, and rewritings. 135   Again, certain anonymous 
remanieurs also remodeled in part the Vulgate Cycle of Arthurian prose romances by 
including a so-called Livre d’Artus, which introduced new incidents and characters, 
provided references and details explaining several incidents left so far unanswered, 
and brought to a conclusion certain themes referred to in the Arthurian corpus as 
developed up to that point.136  Starting from 1235, anonymous authors, attracting 
then continuators and remanieurs, took to the next level the derivative reuse of 
characters and themes by adding the tale of one or more generations. 137   For 
instance, Gurion le Courtois was a pre-Arthurian chronicle telling the stories of the 
fathers of the Arthurian heroes, whereas Ysaÿe le Triste recounted the story of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
132  See BRUCKNER, CHRÉTIEN CONTINUED, supra note 123, at 12–15; Pickens, Busby, & 
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136 See Bogdanow & Trachsel, supra note 134, at 357–64. 
137 Id. at 364–67. 
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sons of the Knights of the Round Table after the death of Arthur.138  The public knew 
some of these characters since the Chrétien’s Romances, but others were introduced 
anew.  They soon became common heritage at the free disposal of other writers, who 
interpolated parts of the Gurion romance back into the original Arthurian stories.139 
This account of the history of medieval Arthurian literature is only a preview of 
the amazing creative explosion that detonated all over Europe in less than a century 
through continuations, adaptations, translations, interpolations, and rewritings of 
the Arthurian saga.  In the romance literature, open reuse and borrowing of iconic 
characters and related themes promoted relentless creative inspiration.  Arthur, 
Lancelot, Guinevere, Perceval, Gauvain, Yvain, Merlin, and Tristan were endlessly 
exploited, reinvented, and transformed, while they traveled from Britain to France, 
Germany, and then back again to Britain.  Their stories were continuously reworked 
or continued.  Each rewriter, continuator, translator, and compiler added new 
details. By slow accretion, these new details grew into a new picture.  They became 
the story as we know it now.  Chretien’s or Robert de Boron’s narrative, which was 
extensively plundered by the many that came after them,140 turned into something 
they would have hardly expected. Chrétien himself, however, sang the powerful 
creative beauty of joining together, mashing up, and reworking borrowed characters, 
themes, and motifs.  He was a rewriter before being rewritten.141 To Chrétien writing 
was to draw from a tale of adventure “une mout bele conjointure.”142  The whole 
history of the Arthurian romance is that of recursive beautiful conjunctions.  From 
the intersections of previous borrowed story-lines and episodes, new stories were 
born, old stories were reinvigorated, and the cumulative mouvance of old and new, 
original and derivative, faded away into “the story.”  As Roger Loomis hinted at in 
                                                                                                                                                 
138 Id. at 364, 366. 
139 Id. at 365. 
140  See BEATE SCHMOLKE-HASSELMANN, THE EVOLUTION OF ARTHURIAN ROMANCE:  THE 
VERSE TRADITION FROM CHRÉTIEN TO FROISSART 181–220 (1998) (discussing at length borrowings, 
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see also Douglas Kelly, Chrétien de Troyes, in THE ARTHUR OF THE FRENCH, supra note 114, at 156–
62, 156.  Kelly wrote: 
 
[T]he combination of two or more entities is a conjuncture . . . [t]he Erec passage 
fits this meaning when Chrétien says that he draws his conjuncture from a tale, 
thus suggesting that he is lifting parts from the tale or from a number of different 
versions of a tale, and recombining them in a new version. 
 
Id. 
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the title of one fundamental text on the subject, the Arthurian Romance is a 
“collaborative history.”143 
F. Ludovico Ariosto’s Testimony:  From the Chanson to the Frenzy of Roland 
Ludovico Ariosto (1474–1533), the Italian author of the Renaissance masterpiece 
Orlando Furioso [The Frenzy of Roland] (1516), brought his testimony as well.  
Ariosto explained that his great work was the result of a cumulative tradition 
building upon an endless line of rewritings, borrowings, and open reuses that have 
characterized the chanson de geste, and especially the Chanson de Roland. 
The Chanson de Roland is the most celebrated of Old French chansons de geste, 
which sung of the epic “deeds” of a hero.  The Chanson de Roland recounts the story 
of Roland, Charlemagne’s nephew.  Jongleurs carried the Chanson de Roland far and 
wide, from France to England, Italy, Germany, and Spain.  The formulaic language 
seems to indicate an oral origin for the Chanson de Roland.144  Even if we assume 
that the Chanson the Roland was the result of an anonymous writer of genius—a 
remanieur de genie—coming into contact with the oral tradition,145 the work is the 
product of “elaboration over [a few] centuries by hundreds, perhaps even thousands, 
of poets.”146  As Joseph Duggan noted, the poem should not be treated “as a monolith, 
but rather as a work which passed through a long process of continual creation before 
being written down in the Oxford manuscript.”147  In fact, Duggan continued, “the 
normal way for narrative songs to grow from simple chants d’actualité to true epics, 
in both proportion and scope, is precisely through a process of multisecular 
accretion.”148 
One defining character of chansons de geste is that they went through a process 
of so-called “cyclization.”149  This process revolved around the role of iconic characters 
                                                                                                                                                 
143  ARTHURIAN LITERATURE IN THE MIDDLE AGES:  A COLLABORATIVE HISTORY (Roger S. 
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LITERATURE 29 (William Burgwinkle, Nicholas Hammond, & Emma Wilson eds., 2011); CATHERINE 
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or groups of characters promoting the formation of “cycles.”  Meeting the request of 
the public, singers, jongleurs, and authors created poetic and legendary genealogies 
of the most successful heroes.  By the middle of the twelfth century, new chanson 
sprang out from the original poems to sing the earlier or later adventures of the 
heroes, their ancestors and descendants.  Three main cycles have acquired specific 
prominence, as famously grouped by Bertrand de Bar-sur Abe in his Girart de 
Vienne, a chanson written in the late twelfth century:  1) the geste du roi, telling the 
deeds of Charlemagne or a hero from his lineage, usually his nephew Roland; 2) the 
geste de Garin de Monglane, having as a central character Guillame d’Orange, 
supposedly the great-grand son of Garin; and 3) the geste de Doon de Mayence, 
concerning traitors and rebels against the royal power and centering on the 
characters of Renaud de Montauban and Girart de Roussillon.150 
The figure of Roland, together with his companion Olivier and the magic horse 
Bayard, which is dominant in the geste de roi cycle, also recurred constantly in the 
songs of other cycles.  Roland played the role of protagonist in several adventures 
preceding the battle of Roncesvalles, such as those told in the Chanson d’Aspremont, 
Otinel, or Entrée d’Espagne.151  In other songs, Roland was portrayed as one of the 
leading knights in Charlemagne’s court.  In Girart de Vienne, which was part of the 
geste de Garin de Monglan cycle, the first encounter between Roland and Olivier was 
described in connection with a duel of the two heroes near Vienne, after which 
Roland and Olivier swore eternal friendship.152  Meanwhile, the story of Roland was:  
1) adapted into Southern Occitan speaking France, such as in Rollan a Saragossa 
and Ronsasvals; 2) translated and adapted into the German Rolandslied by Konrad 
der Pfaffe, the Spanish Roncesvalles, and the Old Norse Karlamagnús saga; 3) 
developed and re-elaborated by the Italian literature; 4) adapted into prose in many 
languages with enormous success; and 5) visually translated into the Sicilian Pupi 
theater.  For another example of cross-country rewriting, circulation, and influence, 
the unfinished thirteenth-century German epic Willehalm by the poet Wolfram von 
Eschenbach was based on the French chanson Aliscans.  It expanded and adapted 
the earlier Chanson de Guillaume, perhaps the oldest song of the geste de Garin de 
Monglane cycle.153  Through the endless line of retellings, translations, variants, and 
rearrangements, the story was transformed and expanded with the inclusion of new 
characters, the modification of the old and the emergence of new scenarios, elements, 
and episodes, potentially open to new retellings.  Roland, as well as the heroes of the 
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MEDIEVAL KNIGHTHOOD II:  PAPERS FROM THE THIRD STRAWBERRY HILL CONFERENCE 46–47 (1988). 
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other cycles, witnessed a process of slow transformation and adaptation to the 
changing cultural and literary landscape.  As Finn Sinclair highlighted: 
The essential point to note here is that epic texts, by their very nature as 
texts spanning the oral/literary divide, were subject to mouvance—that is, 
to reinvention, renewal and rewriting.  Even if they were composed as 
integral poems, their subsequent dissemination through singing and 
performance, and through repeated copying over the years, produced living 
texts, open to transformation and regeneration in response to their 
changing context.154 
Singers and jongleurs, and later literary authors, would pick the new themes 
and turn them into new cycles, possibly leading to new masterpieces and the 
emergence of new genres at some point along the line of retellings.  In the fourteenth-
century Franco-Venetian Entrée d’Espagne, for example, Roland would become an 
errant knight, borrowing this motif from the increasingly successful Arthurian 
Romances and setting the background for the Italian epic of the late fifteenth century 
and early sixteenth century.155 
The proliferation of a tradition of living texts that have been inspired by process 
of regeneration, continuations, and rewriting—which developed around the open 
reuse of characters and themes of the Chanson de Roland and chanson de geste at the 
intersection of oral and literary tradition—was finally crystallized and reaffirmed in 
one of the last literary masterpieces of the Western Renaissance.  Ariosto’s Orlando 
Furioso is an extraordinary example of cumulative and collaborative creativity that 
modern copyright policies would thwart.  Ariosto’s Orlando Furioso was a 
continuation of Matteo Maria Boiardo’s unfinished Orlando Innamorato (1495)—
Roland in Love.156  Boiardo’s work at once drew characters, themes, and parodistic 
inspiration from Luigi Pulci’s Morgante (1478–1483).157  Pulci, in fact, has supposedly 
reworked an anonymous fourteenth-century Orlando in the first part of his poem and 
based the last five cantos of his romance on La Spagna in ottava rima, a mid-
fourteenth-century adaptation and rewriting of the Entrée d’Espagne.158  Ariosto, 
Boiardo, and Pulci all adapted a twelfth century Old French chanson de geste known 
as Les Quatre Fils Aymon—The Four Sons of Aymon, frequently referred to simply 
as the tale of Renaud de Montauban—and mashed it up with the Chanson de Roland 
and later variations.  Ariosto invited other writers to continue the story of Angelica 
                                                                                                                                                 
154 Sinclair, supra note 149, at 28. 
155 See ANONIMO PADOVANO [ANONYMOUS FROM PADUA], L’ENTRÉE D’ESPAGNE:  ROLANDO DA 
PAMPLONA ALL’ORIENTE [THE ENTRÉE D’ESPAGNE:  ROLAND FROM PAMPLONA TO THE FAR EAST] 
(2011); NICOLÒ DA VERONA, CONTINUAZIONE DELL’ENTRÉE D’ESPAGNE (1992) (continuing the 
narration left unfinished in the Entrée d’Espagne to reach close to the happenings told in the 
Chanson the Roland). 
156 See MATTEO MARIA BOIARDO, ORLANDO INNAMORATO (Charles S. Ross trans. & ed., 2004). 
157 See LUIGI PULCI, MORGANTE:  THE EPIC ADVENTURES OF ORLANDO AND HIS GIANT FRIEND 
(Joseph Tusiani trans., Edoardo Lèbano ed., 1998). 
158  See JANE E. EVERSON, THE ITALIAN ROMANCE EPIC IN THE AGE OF HUMANISM:  THE 
MATTER OF ITALY AND THE WORLD OF ROME 30 n.5 (2001); CONSTANCE JORDAN, PULCI’S MORGANTE:  
POETRY AND HISTORY IN FIFTEENTH-CENTURY FLORENCE 46 (1986). 
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with the verse “forse altri canterà con miglior plettro.”159  The invitation was not left 
unheard and several sequels were produced in Italian and Spanish.160 
G. Shakespeare Testimony:  Plagiarism, Feathers, and Crows 
The Immortal Bard, Shakespeare, could not be missing from the catalogue of 
artists and authors willing to support Chuck D’s case.  Robert Greene described his 
younger contemporary, Shakespeare, as “an upstart crow beautified with our 
feathers.”161  Resenting Shakespeare for dipping too far into his Pandosto for The 
Winter’s Tale,162 or perhaps after assisting a performance of Henry VI,163 Greene 
warned other writers to abandon playwriting because Shakespeare “with his Tygers 
hart wrapt in a Players hyde, supposes he is . . . an absolute Johannes fac totum, is 
in his owne conceit the onely Shake-scene in a countrey.” 164  And, indeed, 
Shakespeare was, in modern terms, a plagiarist on a vast scale. According to Malone, 
out of 6,033 lines of parts I, II, and III of Henry VI, Shakespeare copied 1,771 
verbatim and paraphrased 2,373.165  Whole passages of Antony and Cleopatra, to 
take just one example, were line-by-line versifications of prose historical works.166  
Again, in The Tempest, Gonzalo’s description of the ideal state was a word-for-word 
transposition of Michel de Montaigne’s essays Of the Cannibals, as translated by 
John Florio in 1603.167  Modern copyright laws might conceivably have stifled almost 
all of Shakespeare’s works at birth because they ‘stole’ from Raphael Holinshed’s and 
Edward Hall’s prose histories of England, Thomas North’s translation of Plutarch, 
                                                                                                                                                 
159  LUDOVICO ARIOSTO, ORLANDO FURIOSO, XXX.16 l. 8 (William S. Rose trans., 2006) 
(“Perchance some voice in happier verse may sing.”). 
160 See DAVID QUINT, ORIGIN AND ORIGINALITY IN RENAISSANCE LITERATURE:  VERSIONS OF 
THE SOURCE 4 (1983). 
161  ROBERT GREENE, GROATSWORTH OF WIT:  BOUGHT WITH A MILLION OF REPENTANCE:  
DESCRIBING THE FOLLY OF YOUTH, THE FALSEHOOD OF MAKE-SHIFT FLATTERERS, THE MISERY OF 
THE NEGLIGENT, AND MISCHIEFS OF DECEIVING COURTESANS, WRITTEN BEFORE HIS DEATH, AND 
PUBLISHED AT HIS DYING REQUEST 83 (1919); see also TERENCE SCHOONE-JONGEN, SHAKESPEARE’S 
COMPANIES:  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE’S EARLY CAREER AND THE ACTING COMPANIES, 1577–1594 18–
21 (2008) (discussing the interpretation of Greene’s passage); ALEXANDRA HALASZ, THE 
MARKETPLACE OF PRINT:  PAMPHLETS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND (1997). 
162 See ALEXANDER LINDEY, PLAGIARISM AND ORIGINALITY 75 (1952). 
163 See ILYA GILIOV, THE SHAKESPEARE GAME:  THE MYSTERY OF THE GREAT PHOENIX 120 
(2003) (In fact, Greene’s passage seems to parody a quotation in the third part of Henry VI:  “Tygers 
hart wrapt in a woman’s hyde.”). 
164 GREENE, supra note 161, at 83–85. 
165 See LINDEY, supra note 162, at 75. 
166 See William St Clair, Metaphors of Intellectual Property, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY, 
ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 384 (Ronan Deazley, Martin Kretschmer, & Lionel Bently 
eds., 2010); MARGRETA DEGRAZIA, SHAKESPEARE VERBATIM 132–76 (1991). 
167 See Michel de Montaigne, On Cannibals, in MONTAIGNE’S ESSAYS I 30 (John Florio trans., 
1603), available at http://www.luminarium.org/renascence-editions/montaigne/1xxx.htm; William 
Shakespeare, The Tempest, in THE DRAMATIC WORKS OF SHAKESPEARE:  FROM THE TEXT OF 
JOHNSON AND STEEVENS 8 (1836); SAMUEL R. DELANY, LONGER VIEWS:  EXTENDED ESSAYS 225 
(1996); LINDEY, supra note 162, at 74–75. 
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Arthur Brooke’s poem Romeo and Juliet, Chapman’s Homer, Golding’s Ovid, and 
many others.168 
The extensive—and unacknowledged—appropriations of Shakespeare were 
commonplace in early modern England.  It was especially common in drama, 
although it was widespread in all literary fields.169  The Mock Astrologer of Dryden is 
a manifesto of proud plagiarism, and self-conscious reuse of others’ plots and stories.  
In the prologue of the play, Dryden laid down his own apologia of plagiarism: 
I am tax’d with stealing all my Playes. . . .  ‘Tis true, that where ever I have 
lik’d any story in a Romance, Novel or forreign Play, I have made no 
difficulty, nor ever shall, to take the foundation of it, to build it up, and to 
make it proper for the English stage.170 
In writing his play, Dryden had drawn on Pedro Calderón de la Barca’s El 
Astrologo Fingido and Thomas Corneille’s Le Feint Astrologue, from which, by 
Dryden own admission, he “rejected some adventures . . . [and] heightened those 
which [he has] chosen; and . . . added others which were neither in the French or 
Spanish.”171  In a quest for perfection among giants of the stage, Calderon, Corneille, 
and Dryden’s plays each imitated those of the predecessor’s, each separated by 
twenty years.  This very successful pattern of re-use would be impossible under 
modern copyright policies. 
Borrowing flourished in sixteenth-century England to such an extent that Sir 
Sidney Lee noted that “[t]he full story of the Elizabethan sonnet is, for the most part, 
a suggestive chapter in the literary records of plagiarism.”172  Even the greatest of 
the Elizabethan sonneteers transcribed the language and the sentiments of popular 
French and Italian poetry. 173   Plagiarism was not at all considered a creative 
mischief.  As Harold White noted, “[n]ot only were Englishmen from 1500 to 1625 
without any feeling analogous to the modern attitude toward plagiarism; they even 
lacked the word until the very end of that period.”174 
                                                                                                                                                 
168  See Nick Groom, Forgery, Plagiarism, Imitation, Pegleggery, in PLAGIARISM IN EARLY 
MODERN ENGLAND, supra note 74, at 79. 
169  See PAULINA KEWES, AUTHORSHIP AND APPROPRIATION:  WRITING FOR THE STAGE IN 
ENGLAND 1660–1710 (1998) [hereinafter KEWES, AUTHORSHIP AND APPROPRIATION]; Paulina Kewes, 
“A Play, Which I Presume to Call Original”:  Appropriation, Creative Genius and Eighteenth-Century 
Playwriting, 34 STUD. IN THE LITERARY IMAGINATION 17, 17 (2001). 
170 John Dryden, Preface to the Mock Astrologer (1671), in THE CRITICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS 
PROSE WORKS OF JOHN DRYDEN, NOW FIRST COLLECTED 202 (Edmond Malone ed., 1800). 
171 Id. at 203. 
172 Sidney Lee, The Elizabethan Sonnet, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 
248 (1918). 
173 Id. 
174  HAROLD O. WHITE, PLAGIARISM AND IMITATION DURING THE EARLY RENAISSANCE 202 
(1935). 
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H. Coleridge’s Testimony:  The Divine Ventriloquist and the Obsession with Absolute 
Originality 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge then came in and his testimony shed light on the 
process leading to the denial of the cumulative and collaborative nature of creativity.  
Trying to accommodate the tension amongst originality, appropriation, and 
plagiarism, Coleridge justified one notorious accusation of plagiarism from Schelling 
by claiming:  “I regard the Truth as a divine Ventriloquist:  I care not from whose 
mouth the sounds are supposed to proceed, if only the words are audible and 
intelligible.”175 
From the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a new creative paradigm based 
on autogenous originality and invention emerged from the ashes of imitative 
practices and erudite borrowing.  In a few years, the Statute of Anne would be 
enacted.  Original authorship was on the rise, and plagiarism was viewed more and 
more as a creative mischief.  As Martha Woodmansee argued, modern “copyright” 
and “authors’ rights” laws are tightly correlated with the emergence of the modern 
concept of art in the eighteenth century.176  The new conceptualization of art and 
authorship emerged from a markedly different individualistic vision of men.  It was a 
by-product of a new idea of genius that fully expanded on the evolution earlier 
propelled by Dürer and Renaissance super-artists.  The construction of the idea of 
genius, as an “instinctive and extraordinary capacity for imaginative creation, 
original thought, invention or discovery,”177 is said to have originated in England and 
to have acquired special prominence in Germany.178  The special focus on originality 
and genius rapidly became the field of research of a number of breakthrough works.  
Examples include The Conjectures on Original Composition by Edward Young, An 
Essay on Genius by Alexander Gerard, and An Essay on Original Genius by William 
Duff.179  In his Conjectures, Young made originality the tract of a man of genius.  He 
rejected imitation, driving it to the periphery of creative efforts:  “The mind of a man 
of Genius is fertile and pleasant field, pleasant as Elysium, and fertile as Tempe; it 
enjoys a perpetual Spring.  Of that Spring, Originals are the fairest Flowers:  
                                                                                                                                                 
175 SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, BIOGRAPHIA LITERARIA:  OR, BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF MY 
LITERARY LIFE AND OPINIONS 153 (Princeton Univ. Press 1983) (1817).  Together with the metaphor 
of the “divine ventriloquist,” Coleridge also deployed the phenomenon of ocular spectra and the 
concept of the “genial coincidence” to describe his plagiarism. See TILAR J. MAZZEO, PLAGIARISM AND 
LITERARY PROPERTY IN THE ROMANTIC PERIOD 26–48 (2007). 
176 See MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART AND THE MARKET:  Rereading the History of 
Aesthetics (1996) (reviewing the German debate over the nature of a book and discussing how the 
rise of art in the eighteenth century produced a new aesthetic paradigm and new ideas about artistic 
production that got incorporated into, and empowered by, the copyright and authors’ rights laws); 
Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright:  Economic and Legal Conditions of the 
Emergence of the Author, 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425, 425–48 (1984). 
177 Jonathan Bate, Shakespeare and Original Genius, in GENIUS:  THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 90 
(Penelope Murray ed., 1989). 
178 Id. 
179 See Edward Young, Conjectures on Original Composition, in a LETTER to the Author of Sir 
Charles Grandison (2d ed., 1759); ALEXANDER GERARD, AN ESSAY ON GENIUS (1773); WILLIAM 
DUFF, ESSAY ON ORIGINAL GENIUS AND ITS VARIOUS MODES OF EXERTION IN PHILOSOPHY AND THE 
FINE ARTS, PARTICULARLY IN POETRY (1767). 
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Imitations are of quicker growth, but fainter bloom.”180  Imitation, “the sincerest form 
of flattery” to an Elizabethan playwright only a century earlier,181 was driven to the 
periphery of creativity.  Plagiarism became a “sordid Theft” to be ruled out 
altogether, as Young wondered “[h]ope we, from Plagiarism, any Dominion in 
Literature; as that of Rome arose from a nest of Thieves?”182 
However, Young still related the creative act of a genius to some invisible divine 
afflatus in accordance with the Ciceronian tradition.183  The last veil before the full 
individualistic empowerment of creativity still remained, but not for long.  It was at 
this time that Alexander Gerard asserted that “genius is properly the faculty of 
invention . . . by means of which a man is qualified . . . for producing original works 
of art.”184  The power of imagination was a power of the human mind, not a godly 
inspiration.185  As Gerard argued, the source of genius was internal, not external.  
The exclusion of the external endowment radically changed the perception of 
creativity.  Creativity became purely individual, a personal experience.  
Communitarian participation was suddenly excluded from the process of creative 
production. 
In this respect, the presence of an external divine endowment kept in place a 
model of open reuse, exchange and sharing of others’ creativity.  If a gift was given to 
the author, he was under obligation to give back to the community some of what he 
had received.  Imitation, plagiarism, and borrowing were instrumental to return to 
the people what God—or the community, if we draw from a perspective where God is 
a construction of a community need—had given to the author.186 
Kant would later elaborate on Gerard’s insights by arguing that genius properly 
consists in the “happy relation” between the faculties of imagination and 
understanding. 187   Like Gerard, Kant stressed that the creative moment is an 
internal process.188  Kant took a further logical step by crystallizing originality as the 
central property of modern aesthetic.  An immediate consequence of the fact that 
genius “is not a mere aptitude for what can be learned by a rule,” but “a talent for 
producing that for which no definite rule can be given,” is Kant’s position that 
“originality must be its first property.”189  The romantic author was now fully shaped.  
Meanwhile, the demise of imitation, plagiarism, and collaborative creativity was well 
on its way.  By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Hegel would note, “an 
ingenious and trivial idea, and a change in external form, is rated so highly as 
                                                                                                                                                 
180 YOUNG, supra note 179, at 7. 
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originality and a product of independent thinking that the thought of plagiarism 
becomes wholly insufferable.” 190 
As Paulina Kewes argued, accusations of plagiarisms spared few authors, and 
marked a changing cultural paradigm.191  One of the earliest controversies over the 
morality of literary copying and imitation involved two French choreographers.192  In 
1623, François de Lauze embarked on an aggressive campaign to name and shame 
one Berthélemy de Montagut, who had stolen his treaty on dancing.  The three pages 
introducing de Lauze’s Apologie de la danse detailed how an early draft of that very 
same book was appropriated by de Montagut and published under the title Louange 
de la danse.193  Although this first attempt to publicly stigmatize an instance of 
plagiarism was partially unsuccessful,194 a changing sensitivity toward the issue was 
emerging.195  Modern attitudes to literary property can also be traced in Langbaine’s 
Momus Triumphans; or, The Plagiaries of the English Stage.  Langbaine’s short book 
was an arraignment for theft in English plays, written at the end of the seventeenth 
century.  After listing sources and analogues of all the published English drama, 
Langbaine concluded: 
[H]aving read most of our English Plays, as well ancient as those of latter 
date, I found that our modern Writers had made Incursions into the 
deceas’d Authors Labours, and robb’d them of their Fame. . . . I know that I 
cannot do a better service to their memory, than by taking notice of the 
Plagiaries, who have been so free to borrow, and to endeavour to vindicate 
the Fame of these ancient Authors from whom they took their Spoiles.196 
In the eighteenth century, accusations of plagiarism became commonplace.  
Jonson, Pope, Dryden, and Milton all faced accusations of plagiarism.  At the very 
same time, they appeared to champion the emerging new ideal of original 
authorship. 197   The Milton affair exemplifies the transformation of the cultural 
                                                                                                                                                 
190 GEORG FRIEDRICH WILHELM HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHTS § 69 (Thomas M. Knox trans., 
1967). 
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192  See Barbara Ravelhofer, The Medium of Plagiarism:  Rogue Choreographers in Early 
Modern London, in PLAGIARISM IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND, supra note 74, at 134–47. 
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landscape. 198   William Lauder manufactured fraudulent charges of plagiarism 
against Milton in a series of articles in The Gentleman’s Magazine, later collected in 
1750 as An Essay on Milton’s Use and Imitation of the Moderns, in his Paradise Lost.  
The alleged plagiarism later proved to be a forgery.  Lauder was soon discovered.  
But the case stirred up quite a controversy and “the severity of the accusation 
indicates an anxiety of originality becoming an obsession, with the concomitant fears 
that the sacred well of individual genius can be poisoned or simply drawn dry by 
intruders.”199 
This obsession grew at the beginning of the nineteenth century, so that public 
controversies surrounding plagiarism hit most of the British Romantic authors.  In 
the early nineteenth century, appropriation strategies had been most famously 
associated with Samuel Taylor Coleridge. 200   Coleridge had to face recursive 
accusations of plagiarism.201  In his monumental work, Coleridge:  The Damaged 
Archangel, Norman Fruman specifically discussed the question of Coleridge’s 
unacknowledged sources.  Fruman traced the history of the controversy that spanned 
for over a century from its origins in the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth 
century.202  Thomas DeQuincey and Wordsworth largely contributed to ignite the 
widespread, lasting debate that surrounded Coleridge’s masterpieces such as a Hymn 
before Sun-Rise, France:  An Ode, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, and the 
philosophical works in the Biographia Literaria.203  Wordsworth himself, along with 
Shelley or Lord Byron, were later touched by accusations of plagiarism.204 
The Romantic obsession with plagiarism trespassed into an attempt to turn a 
blind eye on collaboration, assimilation, and the cumulative nature of creativity, 
excluding the community altogether from the discourse about creativity.  The 
excruciating emphasis on Coleridge’s plagiarism, and his alleged exceptionality, 
became a way to negate the failure of the Romantic aesthetic ideology that Coleridge, 
the father of British Romanticism, seems to represent.  In fact, as Mazzeo noted, 
Coleridge’s “borrowings contradict the logic of Romanticism:  he is the brilliant and 
innovative poet who claimed imaginative origins for his work but who borrowed 
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covertly from the texts of other writers.” 205   So, although Coleridge was not an 
anomaly at all, his plagiarism was stigmatized as exceptional because Coleridge 
could be cast “as a damaged individual, consumed by private neuroses” and drug 
addiction.206  The failure of the Romantic ideology of absolute and self-sustaining 
originality was denied by presenting Coleridge’s abnormal persona as an evidence of 
the abnormality of Coleridge’s authorial persona.  The collective, communitarian and 
cumulative nature of creativity was sidelined.  It was seen as the effect of a blurred 
perception of reality from a confused individual.  A quintessential example of the 
failure of the Romantic aesthetic model is deceitfully re-deployed to help marginalize 
the opposing imitative and collaborative paradigm. 
Similarly, the treatment of Homer, Ossian, and Shakespeare shows that 
Romantic ideology transcended into a fabricated denial of the imitative and 
cumulative mechanics of creativity.  It turned the evidence of failure of the system 
into corroborating assumptions.  Perhaps the very notion of original genius was the 
result of a misperception.  The notion, as originating in England, was molded on the 
cardinal example of Shakespeare. 207   Shakespeare’s immense literary reputation 
served to propel the wide acceptance of the modern notion of genius.  Homer was the 
other eminent example of original genius.  Homer, perhaps together with the 
medieval bard Ossian, served as a model to develop the romantic notion.208  These 
assumptions were most likely misplaced. 
There could be much debate and discussion over the nature of creativity of the 
three mentioned paradigmatic models.  Some of that discussion was explicated in the 
preceding pages.  While the creativities of Homer, Ossian, and Shakespeare are 
considered all but undoubtedly original, these supposedly quintessential models of 
original genius reinforce the opposite argument:  primitive originality does not exist 
in art, but every work depends on prior works.  Homer, Ossian, and Shakespeare 
tend to deconstruct the myth of absolute originality, rather than strengthen it.  In 
fact, Homer is most likely a tradition, a true collective author, and the expression of a 
cumulative and participative model of creativity.  Ossian poses very similar 
problems.  Even if one denies the eighteenth-century construction of the legendary 
Gaelic bard Ossian in the “translations” of James Macpherson,209 Ossian is the Anon 
of Virginia Woolf, and his authorship is by definition a participative community 
effort. 
There is much debate on whether the genius of Shakespeare lies in primitive 
originality or in sublime imitation, borrowing, and reuse.  Again, Shakespeare most 
likely raises doubts over the possibility of a primitive originality.  Shakespeare’s 
stories were the result of heavy pillaging on Middle Age and Renaissance popular 
tales and classical and modern history.  In this sense, Shakespeare was imitative and 
wholly unoriginal if we look through the lens of the principles stated in Young’s 
Conjectures.  As Mark Rose noted, “it would be not wholly inappropriate, I think, to 
                                                                                                                                                 
205 MAZZEO, supra note 175, at 7–8. 
206 Id. at 8. 
207 See Bate, supra note 177, at 77. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 93 (discussing it as a possible conclusion). 
[13:341 2014] Rediscovering Cumulative Creativity From the  375 
 Oral Formulaic Tradition to Digital Remix: Can I Get a Witness? 
 
characterize Shakespeare the playwright . . . in a quasi-medieval manner as a 
reteller of tales.”210 
Jonathan Bate, one of the major Shakespearian scholars, argued that the 
claimed original, rather than imitative, nature of Shakespeare’s genius “is untrue of 
course,” because “we now know that Shakespeare read nature through the spectacles 
of many books (Ovid’s foremost among them).”  Bate reinforced the same point by 
noting:  “[M]odern scholarship has shown that Shakespeare’s art depended on the 
assimilation and refashioning of inherited literary and dramatic tradition.”211  Rather 
than individuality, Bate seems to conclude that communality was the defining 
character of Shakespeare’s art: 
Genius became a Romantic obsession because it was a conception that 
seemed to guarantee individuality. . . . Hamlet may be the archetype of the 
individual consciousness, but Shakespeare was not Hamlet.  If anything, he 
was the archetype of communality, not individuality. . . . By “Shakespeare” 
we mean not an individual, but a body of work, and that body was shaped 
by many individuals—by Ovid and Shakespeare’s other literary precursors, 
by Marlowe and his other dramatic precursors, by the actors of his 
company, by the audience without whom no play can be completed.212 
The claims that Shakespeare did not write Shakespeare213 do well to unveil the 
misperception of the Romantic obsession with primitive originality.  The claimants of 
that theory put forward Shakespeare’s plagiarism to prove that others have written 
the plays, supposedly those plagiarized.  As Boyle noted, discussing these claims, 
“[a]fter all, the Immortal Bard would never stoop to copy the works of another.  Once 
again, originality becomes the key.”214  The modern overprotective copyright system 
has been built upon this fabricated denial of the cumulative and imitative nature of 
creativity and the misperceptions that it brought about. 
Chuck D’s plea to get a witness to support his case for sampling and borrowing 
has been heard.  Many have responded, but far more could have come.  In his 
magistral lecture, An Unhurried View of Copyright, Benjamin Kaplan reflected: 
 
[I]f man has any “natural” rights, not the least must be the right to imitate 
his fellows, and thus to reap where he has not sown.  Education, after all, 
proceeds from a kind of mimicry, and “progress,” if it is not entirely an 
illusion, depends on generous indulgence of copying.215 
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Waldo Emerson shared a similar view on the ephemeral nature of originality 
and noted that: 
The originals are not original.  There is imitation, model, and suggestion, to 
the very archangels, if we knew their history.  The first book tyrannizes 
over the second.  Read Tasso, and you think of Virgil; read Virgil, and you 
think of Homer; and Milton forces you to reflect how narrow are the limits 
of human invention.  The Paradise Lost had never existed but for these 
precursors . . . .216 
III. TRIAL BRIEF:  TURNING CUMULATIVE CREATIVITY INTO A NUISANCE 
At first, the witnesses that Chuck D has summoned to support his case, as well 
as that of any other modern digital remixer, may have surprised the court.  In fact, 
who else may have pleaded this case more effectively than Homer and the endless 
line of bards and aoidoi he represents?  Are not the bits that the court claims Chuck 
D stole, that “mineral” he found, the same as the formulae that were reworked over 
and over in the oral formulaic tradition and that produced our epic and romance 
literature and influenced most of our popular culture?  Are not those chunks and bits 
of culture that digital creativity would like to re-use and remix, the same as the 
“harvest of poetry” that Chaucer gleaned “here and there”? 
The review of the process of creating the Iliad and the Odyssey has unveiled the 
mechanics of writing epics.  It is a powerful example of the productivity of a constant 
chain of open re-use of literary stock.  The largest part of culture has been produced 
under a paradigm where imitation, even plagiarism, and social and collaborative 
authorship were constitutional elements of the creative moment.  The literary pillars 
of Western culture, the Iliad and the Odyssey, were fully forged in the furnace of the 
oral-formulaic tradition.  Later Medieval epics and romance de geste grew out of that 
tradition under the aegis of Macrobius’ art of rewriting and Latin principles of 
imitatio.  Continuations, free re-use of stories and plots, and remodeling of iconic 
figures and characters made romance literature a powerful vehicle propelling cross-
country circulation of culture and the development of modern European languages.  
At any step of our cultural history, we are presented with overwhelming evidences 
that creativity has strived through cumulative evolution, borrowing, appropriation, 
and imitation. 
In contrast, modern policies for creativity are engineered in a fashion that 
thwart the re-use of information, knowledge, and creativity, rather than facilitate it.  
Under the current regime, works are supposedly created as perfect, self-sustaining 
artifacts from the moment of their creation.  Any modification, derivation, cumulative 
addition must secure preventive approval and must be paid off, as if it is a nuisance 
for society.  This becomes increasingly true as a consequence of extended terms of 
protection, expansion of authorship rights, and hurdles involved with clearing 
copyrights in order to perform additional reuse.  In this sense, commodification of 
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culture and copyright expansion, especially its emphasis on a strictly enforced control 
over derivative works, contradicts the very essence of human creativity. 
A. Copyright Culture, Clearance Culture and “Feared Uses” 
“As virtually any clown can attest, no one owns the idea of making a balloon dog, 
and the shape created by twisting a balloon into a dog-like form is part of the public 
domain.”217  The appropriation artist Jeff Koons seems to disagree with this.  In fact, 
the statement cited above comes from a complaint for declaratory relief that the San 
Francisco bookstore and art gallery Park Life had to file after Koons threatened 
lawsuit for selling a balloon dog-shaped book-end supposedly infringing on Koons’ 
well-known balloon dog sculptures.218  Besides the risible claim—that was in fact 
easily demolished by the timely expert testimony of Dr. Bozo—the case is telling of 
an over-expanding copyright culture threatening judicial enforcement in order to 
prevent the use and re-use of the common stock of knowledge.  Any use, to which 
economic or cultural value is attached, tends to trigger the reaction of alleged 
copyright owners.   Copyright culture has become so pervasive that even silence may 
become a possible ground for reaction.219  A cartoonist may no longer imitate news 
crawls parodying Fox News’ right-wing slant because—as Matt Groening, author of 
The Simpsons, drily noted—“[i]t might confuse the viewers into thinking it’s real 
news.”220  Miscellaneous stories of ordinary copyright madness have multiplied in the 
last decade.  From rightsholders’ reactions against Girl Scout campfire sing-alongs 
and day care facilities distributing sheet music to children,221 to Sony DMCA’s claims 
against the re-engineering robot dog AIBO’s jazz dance, 222 clearance culture practices 
have profoundly influenced our cultural landscape.  Absent proof of clearance, 
filmmakers would be totally unable to insure, screen, or distribute movies.223  It may 
even be impossible to clear the rights of a The Simpsons’ clip running on a 
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background TV set, accidentally shot in a documentary about Wagner. 224   The 
publishing industry follows almost identical rules and clearance practices.  It dictates 
which content may reach the marketplace, including whether an author is entitled to 
title a novel Panasonic.225 
Creative behaviors that—as we have discussed at length—were commonplace 
and incentivized for most of human history have become increasingly harder to 
undertake today.  In fact, the insurmountable hurdles related to the overbroad 
expansion of copyright—and its judicial enforcement backed up by the design of 
modern copyright law—highly discourage the traditional mechanics of creativity.  
Facing the impossibility of distributing the award-winning animated movie Sita 
Sings the Blues because of the copyright hurdles stemming from clearing the rights 
in 1920s jazz songs used in the movie, the film critic Roger Ebert wonders “[e]ighty 
years later . . . [d]on’t the copyright owners realize they are contributing to the 
destruction of their property by removing it from knowledge?” 226   Freedom of 
expression, and thus our capacity to create cumulative culture, becomes often merely 
theoretical: 
Copyright’s inconstant, unpredictable free speech safety valves, coupled 
with the high cost of litigation, have endangered a “clear it or delete it” 
culture in which these gateways intermediaries—and their errors and 
omissions insurance carriers—regularly insist that speakers obtain 
permissions for all potentially actionable uses, even those that likely do not 
infringe.227 
As it is engineered, copyright law obliges whoever wants to use protected 
material to clear the copyrights by meeting the conditions set by the holder.228  
Backed up by this principle of exclusivity, copyright holders expand their control over 
intellectual content through the interaction of concomitant factors.  First, the 
individual is often practically incapable of clearing the complex bundle of rights 
involved in copyrighted content.  Second, more and more often, threatening judicial 
enforcement becomes a practice transforming copyright protection from a defensive 
tool into an offensive weapon hindering, rather than promoting, culture and progress.  
The economic hurdles involved in facing a copyright infringement lawsuit are in 
themselves a bar to any unlicensed use of the content, whether it is fair or not. 
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On first account, statutory damages make it very attractive to sue for copyright 
infringement in the United States.229  Statutory damages can be significantly higher 
than the actual damages suffered by the rightsholders.230  This is because statutory 
damages compensate rightsholders per work as opposed to compensation for losses.  
Under United States copyright law, statutory damages may range from $750 to 
$150,000 per work, if willful infringement can be shown.231  If the last figure is 
applied, statutory damages can escalate quickly and get so high that somebody at the 
Record Industry Association of America may even believe that copyright 
infringement may be worth trillions!232  This astounding amount was demanded by a 
few record companies from LimeWire, a company distributing the most downloaded 
free peer-to-peer file-sharing client program. 233   The recording industry tried to 
stretch statutory damages to their limits, by arguing that Section 504(c)(1) of the 
Copyright Act provided for damages for each infringement where more than one 
party was liable.234  Wisely enough, the Manhattan federal district court observed, 
“[a]s Defendants note, Plaintiffs are suggesting an award that is ‘more money than 
the entire music recording industry has made since Edison’s invention of the 
phonograph in 1877.’”235 
The obscurity of copyright law adds to the problem.  Fair use has been described 
by the Second Circuit as “the most troublesome [doctrine] in the whole law of 
copyright.”236  Similarly, copyright terms have increasingly become an unresolvable 
conundrum.  The status of one of the most popular American songs, “Happy Birthday 
to You,” even deceived Justice Breyer in his dissenting opinion in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft237—and after a sixty-eight-page-long article from Robert Brauneis, based on 
hundreds of sources almost inaccessible to the layman, perhaps some doubts still 
remain.238  The inherent complexity and unpredictability of fair use decisions in the 
United States—and the intricacies of copyright terms—have facilitated the 
aggressive litigation posture of copyright holders.  Complexity of copyright law 
causes a high level of uncertainty among users regarding what they can or cannot do 
with creative content.  The complexity of copyright provisions discourages users from 
enforcing privileged or fair uses of copyrighted content in court.  The specter of 
litigation operates as a disincentive for unlawful as well as privileged or fair uses—
the “feared use” fallacy of fair use.  Additionally, this “feared use” fallacy is 
promoting a further indirect expansion of private entitlements against public 
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privileges.  Because of the obscurity of the law and the indeterminacy of the doctrine, 
risk-adverse users are lead into seeking a licence when none is necessary.  In turn, as 
James Gibson pointedly noted, this practice starts a mechanism of rights accretion, 
by making licencing itself a proof that the use is covered by the entitlement, and “rigs 
the intellectual property game in favor of rights-holders.”239 
B. Locking Cultural Icons into the Dungeons of Copyright 
This over-reaching copyright culture translates into the ability of copyright law 
to suppress transformative reuses of copyrighted works.  The enhanced protection of 
derivative works operated by modern copyright law, 240  and a shrinking fair use 
doctrine,241 turn transformative uses of previous works into a nuisance for society, 
rather than a creative opportunity.  The parallelism between past and present 
highlights the incapacity of the present copyright system to recreate the cumulative 
and collaborative creative process that was so fruitful in the past.  In particular, the 
constant development and recursive use of iconic characters—which was an engine 
for creativity in the epic literature—is but a fading memory.  Nowadays, 
transformative use, characters, and cultural icons are locked into the dungeons of 
copyright, the constant enlargement of which has tightened the chains holding them.  
This, in turn, seems to prevent the cumulative creation of pop culture as witnessed in 
the pre-modern oral-formulaic creative process, and generally in the development of 
most human art and culture. 
The speech-enhancing role of cultural icons and iconic characters is abridged in 
at least two different directions.  On a first immediate level, modern copyright 
hinders the re-use of cultural icons and iconic characters as an engine of new and 
cumulative popular stories and creativity.  It is clear that under the present 
copyright regime, these re-uses are prevented unless permission is given.  On a more 
subtle level, copyright law prevents the capacity of follow-on creators to make an 
expressive meaning through the reference to a copyrighted item.  This hindering 
effect of copyright has the pernicious result of impeding newcomers from using 
copyrighted information in order to challenge and oppose the mainstream culture 
that the copyrighted item represents. 
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Under the present copyright paradigm, any reuse of copyrighted characters 
constitutes infringement.242  Some narrow exceptions—basically in case of a clear-cut 
parodying purpose—may apply.243  But even in those instances the limitations to 
copyright enforcement are uncertain at best.  All modern cultural icons—such as the 
Disney characters, the Marvel characters, or the characters of Star Wars, Harry 
Potter, James Bond, or Rocky—are fiercely guarded by their rightsholders.  Recently, 
Warner Bros. has been very active in preventing any unauthorized re-use of themes 
and characters from the Harry Potter saga.  In Warner Bros. v. RDR Books, the 
Southern District Court of New York enjoined the publication of The Harry Potter 
Lexicon, a collection of factual information related to the Harry Potter saga.244  The 
Lexicon in fact was online for a long time as a fan-made repository that was 
extremely popular among fans of the Harry Potter saga.245  J. K. Rowling herself, the 
author of the Harry Potter series, refers to the Lexicon website as “such a great site 
that I have been known to sneak into an internet [sic] café while out writing and 
check a fact rather than go into a bookshop and buy a copy of Harry Potter (which is 
embarrassing).”246  Rowling and her publisher then reacted to the distribution of the 
Dutch translation of Tanya Grotter and the Magical Double Bass by the Russian 
author Dmitri Yemets.247  Yemets’ book featured the story of a female apprentice 
wizard that in part constituted a parody of her British colleague’s work transposed 
into Russian culture and folklore.248  The book was adjudged copyright infringement 
by Dutch courts.249  However, the publication was never enjoined in Russia and a 
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long series of books followed from the first book, together with several other spin-offs 
from the Tanya Grotter series.  In addition, an Indian writer, Uttan Ghosh, wrote an 
adaptation to Rowling’s saga, titled Harry Potter in Calcutta, in which the young 
wizard meets several characters from Bengali literature.250  The publication of the 
story was similarly prevented by the timely intervention of the rightsholders and an 
out-of-court settlement.251 
The treatment of the Russian and Indian adaptations of Harry Potter witnesses 
a sharp contrast to the traditional creative modes of pre-modern popular culture.  
Most of the epic and romance literature strengthened out of the adaptation and 
translation of characters and themes into new social and cultural settings.  In 
contrast, this very creative process is perceived as free-riding by modern standards.  
Was the endless line of Greek poets performing and mashing up the Iliad and the 
Odyssey free-riding over their predecessors?  Were the jongleurs, bards, minstrels, 
and clerks free-riding on each other when they rewrote and performed the Chanson 
de Roland from court to court, from courtyard to courtyard, from France to England, 
from Italy to Spain?  Was Chretien de Troyes free-riding over French and Celtic 
authors when he wrote his Perceval?  Were Wauchier de Denain, Manessier, one 
Gerbert de Montreuil, and a fourth anonymous author free-riding over Chrétien 
when they wrote their continuations to Perceval?  Was Matteo Maria Boiardo free-
riding over Luigi Pulci’s Morgante to write his Orlando Innamorato, and was 
Ludovico Aristo free-riding over both of them when he wrote one of the masterpieces 
of the Renaissance literature, the Orlando Furioso? 
More disturbingly—if there is anything more disturbing than having denied the 
essential rules that governed our cultural history—the emphasis of the present 
copyright system on the exclusive nature of the creative process, rather than its 
inclusive nature, is increasingly showing unexpected and unwanted consequences.  
These results run counter to the values of freedom of expression that our society 
apparently seems to promote.  Even those narrow exceptions that should provide the 
system with some balance seem to often fail their goals.  Having lost the perception 
that creativity is a necessitated instrument of community appurtenance, society has 
hindered the capacity to engage in unrestrained social discourse, especially when 
commodified creativity becomes a cultural standard. 
In a few instances—such as most prominently in the parodying sequel of Gone 
with the Wind, the novel The Wind Done Gone, in which Alice Randall rewrites the 
original story from the black slave’s perspective—freedom of expression has been 
upheld to constrain the enforcement of copyright and allow the free re-use of 
copyrighted characters.252  Unfortunately, this is not always the case.  Recently, the 
Second Circuit confirmed that Fredrik Colting could not revive, at least in the U.S., 
Holden Caulfield and other characters of Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye.253  In 
Salinger v. Colting, the Court decided that it was not fair use for Colting to have a 
76-year-old Holden Caulfield, referred to as Mr. C, brought back to life by a 90-year-
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old author, a fictionalized Salinger, wishing to kill him.254  The plot of Colting’s book, 
60 Years Later:  Coming Through the Rye, struggles with the lifestyle of Salinger, 
who seemingly wanted to remove himself and the memory of his characters from 
society. 255   Salinger has not published since 1965. 256   He has never permitted 
adaptations of his works, other than a 1949 film adaptation of one of his early short 
stories.257  He was in the spotlight for harshly enforcing his copyrights and for an 
endless number of lawsuits.258 
Colting claimed that his book is a “critical examination of the character Holden 
and the way he is portrayed in [The Catcher in the Rye], the relationship between 
Salinger and his iconic creation, and the life of a particular author as he grows old 
but remains imprisoned by the literary character he created.”259  Colting’s critique of 
Salinger seems to be exactly what freedom of expression in a democratic society 
should protect.  To me, personally, then, the story is very meaningful.  I read it as a 
metaphorical allegory of the very arguments I try to put forward here.  The author 
Salinger is a quintessential expression of modern copyright culture and its obsession 
with absolute originality that has long lost sight of the cumulative, collaborative and 
social nature of creativity.  The metaphor embedded in Colting’s book challenges that 
culture by challenging Salinger.  Colting expresses the concern that the final outcome 
of this copyright obsession will be to kill our own characters, together with our own 
culture.  He wishes therefore that Salinger may recover from his obsession and set 
Holden free.  Ironically enough, challenging the publication of the book in court 
proved the very argument that Colting presented in his book.  A court upholding 
Salinger’s claim would empower that argument even further.  The Second Circuit did 
not catch the irony, most likely, and confirmed that characters are locked into the 
dungeons of copyright, if the author wishes so. 
In cases such as Suntrust and Colting, the balance to be struck between freedom 
of expression and private entitlements becomes far more delicate, and often copyright 
law fails to achieve it.  In these instances, the object of copyright protection has 
become a cultural standard.  Therefore, similar competition problems to those in the 
field of technological standards arise when access is sought for participation in the 
social dialogue. 260   Instead of newcomers challenging leading market positions, 
alternative or minority culture may be willing to challenge mainstream culture.  In 
these instances, the owner of copyright in the standard might completely refuse to 
license her work, so to prevent it from being criticized or from being used to convey 
messages to which the author objects. 
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The scenario is the same as that reviewed in nonsensical decisions like Walt 
Disney v. Air Pirates.261  Here, the court denied the right of a group of cartoonists to 
publish an adult “counter-culture” comic book featuring Disney characters “as active 
members of a free thinking, promiscuous, drug ingesting counterculture.”262  In order 
to exclude fair use, the court boasts about the substantiality of the use and near-
verbatim copying, as if the parodist should draw a stylized mouse or duck so that 
nobody will ever catch the reference, and perhaps, in order to help the readers 
understand, they should add a footnote saying:  “we know the drawings suck and do 
not resemble the original, but this scribble is supposed to be Mickey Mouse, Minnie 
or Donald Duck.”263  In these instances, the idea-expression dichotomy is unable to 
prevent a conflict between copyright and free speech.  As Fiona Macmillan has noted, 
“[i]t seems likely that representational copyright works (photographs, films, 
drawings, paintings) are particularly likely to attract the claim that freedom of 
speech cannot be properly served by simply describing the idea behind the 
expression.” 264   Legal standards may slightly change and the idea-expression 
dichotomy may work better with different medium of expression.  Here and there, 
courts may get it right.  Later, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court 
distinguished Air Pirates and held that the parodying use of Roy Orbison’s rock 
ballad “Oh, Pretty Woman” by the rap group 2 Live Crew in their song “Pretty 
Woman” was fair.265 
Although courts may stretch copyright law to make room for cultural standards, 
the tension does not go away.  If the rightsholders feel threatened—economically and 
culturally—they recursively react to the use of cultural icons and try to enforce their 
power of control over them by deploying legal weaponry against derivative re-users.  
Regardless of legal standards adopted by judicial bodies, which are inconsistent and 
unpredictable at best, the rightsholders’ reaction often becomes an insurmountable 
burden to free expression and, in any event, a strong disincentive to it.  The 
California group Negativland, for instance, had its expressive freedom curtailed after 
being sued by Island Record and Warner-Chappell Music for “messing” with U2’s “I 
Still Haven’t Found What I’m Looking For.”266  Negativland’s wrongdoing consisted 
of recasting U2’s music with a musical collage, a commentary, interviews with Bono, 
and outtakes from Casey Kasem’s American Top 40 radio show to criticize a 
perceived hypocrisy in U2’s message.267   Notwithstanding U2’s opposition to the 
lawsuit, Negativland and its independent distributor SST were forced to settle 
because of an inability to afford litigation expenses.268 
Nadia Plesner—a Danish artist and activist—also had to face invasive 
enforcement of cultural icons and has seen her capacity to challenge the meaning of 
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those cultural icons substantially curtailed by copyright and intellectual property 
law.  Among Nadia’s featured works is the satirical depiction of a malnourished 
African child holding a fancy little chihuahua and a designer bag, also included in a 
painting that goes by the name Darfurnica.269  These works of art triggered the 
disgruntled reaction of Louis Vuitton.270  The designer bag carried by the boy, in fact, 
resembles the Louis Vuitton “Audra” bag.271  Louis Vuitton sued, and the Court of 
The Hague rendered an ex parte decision against Nadia Plesner, ordering her to pay 
several hundred thousand euros, including penalties for each day the painting was 
still shown.272  This case deserves attention as an extreme example of the troubled 
coexistence between freedom of expression and property entitlements over creativity.  
Control over intellectual property, especially over copyrighted content, seems to 
trespass into a form of control over our society’s cultural and ethical tenets.  In this 
respect, throughout the decades, Vuitton and others have contributed to a social 
syllogism where display of luxury equals success, and success through display of 
luxury is the trigger for global attention.  In the case of Nadia Plesner, over-
expansive practices of intellectual property enforcement are used to protect and keep 
that syllogism in place, together with the capitalist model that the syllogism is set to 
serve.  Similarly, intellectual property rights may be enforced to prevent the 
emergence of a wide range of counter-cultural speech.  As Madhavi Sunder recently 
observed, intellectual property law, and copyright law especially, substantially 
affects the democratic process because “semiotic democracy requires the ability to 
resignify the artifacts of popular culture to contest their authoritative meaning.”273  
There may be a subtle shift of intellectual property rights as a mechanism to protect 
business goodwill to an instrument of enforcement of cultural paradigms.  Quite 
indisputably, this profound influence of intellectual property rights on our cultural 
landscape is far beyond their literal scope of protection.  As a consequence, 
intellectual property may end up aiding cultural indoctrination and championing 
censorship of opposing cultural paradigms. 
C. Sampling, Identity Politics, and Remix  
Now, I will return to the very case that has prompted Chuck D to seek the 
expert testimony heard in the previous pages.  After the expansionistic copyright 
protection given by decisions like Grand Upright and Bridgeport Music, the “bright 
line rule” has become that either one gets a license or one does not sample.274  As 
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mentioned in the beginning of this article, copyright has negatively and substantially 
affected the music of Public Enemy and many other samplers.  By 1992, the style of 
the critically acclaimed It Takes a Nation of Millions and Fear of a Black Planet was 
no more. The copyright permission paradigm made it forbidden creativity, or at least 
hard enough to make to be practically forbidden.  Building his sonic wall, Public 
Enemy attempted to make use of his own communitarian musical tradition, deeply 
rooted within African American and Caribbean culture of musical borrowing.275  But 
as the law is engineered, Public Enemy, and many other samplers, had to face the 
hurdle that their use of the common African American tradition entailed a process of 
re-appropriation from what was earlier appropriated by the mainstream media and 
entertainment system.  That hurdle proved to be insurmountable.  Copyright law 
affected Public Enemy, and the subculture that they spearheaded, far beyond market 
constraints.  Public Enemy’s work was, as hip-hop music was earlier, representative 
of the cultural identity of a minority reacting to mainstream hegemonic power and 
rapping about “white supremacy, capitalism, the music industry, black nationalism, 
pop culture.”276  One of the innovative features of digital sampling was to empower 
creators with limited market power to produce music by collaging together what was 
traditionally believed to be part of a common pool of musical stock, belonging 
especially to the African American community.  With digital sampling, creators like 
Public Enemy could easily bypass the filter of the music industry and most of the 
economic hurdles associated with preproduction and studio session costs.  Reviewing 
the distinction between copyright in sound recording and composition, the Bridgeport 
court discusses this exact point but misses it.277  By concluding that de minimis 
analysis should not be applied to copyrights over sound recordings, and that 
samplers can simply recreate the riff themselves, the court completely overlooked the 
value that digital sampling has for democratic discourse and identity politics.278 
The hindering effect of copyright over creativity, freedom of expression, and 
identity politics has grown exponentially with the widespread diffusion of digital 
technology and the emergence of remix creativity in an interconnected society.  In 
The Public Domain, Professor Boyle described the story of the song “George Bush 
Doesn’t Care about Black People” by the Legendary K.O.—a protest song against the 
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government in the days of Hurricane Katrina.279  As Boyle discusses in detail, the 
lineage of that song can be traced back through one hundred years of borrowings, 
samplings, and mash-ups.  It features Ray Charles and Clara Ward, all the way to 
Kanye West, the hip hop musician who actually uttered the words giving the song its 
title and emblematic line.  That lineage can be traced back from soul, blues, and 
gospel to rap and hip-hop.  “George Bush Doesn’t Care about Black People” and the 
remix videos made after it became an astounding online hit.  It defined the reaction 
to Hurricane Katrina.  But it never appeared on television and never made it to the 
mainstream media.  Under the present legal framework, that song is illegal.  Or, it is 
at least unmanageable, as far as transaction costs are concerned, to determine 
whether the sampling embedded in it is legal.  Although “George Bush Doesn’t Care 
about Black People” was widely promoted by the power of propagation of the 
Internet, copyright law still relegates digital remix and similar creative models to a 
subcultural niche.  The sad irony is that the mainstream entertainment industry has 
privatized an originally common stock of tunes, sounds, melodies and lyrics behind 
unmanageable copyright transaction costs.  They “have denied the ability of the 
original community to borrow back.” 280   Similarly to the case of Public Enemy’s 
music, Legendary K.O. could cheaply create and bypass the filter of mainstream 
music industry.  The side effect, however, would be to not have access to mainstream 
media channels.  While technology has empowered minorities to more incisively and 
easily express their cultural identities, copyrighted works have the effect of 
restricting them and maintaining them as minor subcultural expressions.  Together 
with the bright line rules that the law or cases like Bridgeport set, copyright blurs 
the contours of what can be and cannot be done, transforming “fair uses” into “feared 
uses.”  Even communal, cumulative and traditional creativity gets swollen in the 
chasms opening up here and there, hidden in the nebula of what the law allows or 
does not allow. 
Most creative practices in the digital domain suffer similar limitations.  
Fangaming—the practice of modifying video games either to create a new video game 
or solely to create a work of art—has experienced great popularity among the gaming 
communities, often in response to the inactivity of copyright owners to offer sequels 
of their favorite games.281  Rightsholders have usually been resolute in shutting down 
those projects, as in the case of Chrono Trigger, a role-playing video game originally 
developed by Square Enix in 1995 and followed by a 1999 official sequel, Chrono 
Cross.282  Fan projects to develop a sequel for PC with 3D graphics, such as Chrono 
Resurrection, Chrono Trigger Remake Project, and Chrono Trigger:  Crimson Echoes, 
were repeatedly undertaken from 2004 to 2009 and forcibly terminated through 
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Square Enix’s cease-and-desist letters.283  The story of the sequel Chrono Trigger 
molds well to the larger picture of the tension between copyright, media 
conglomerate dominance, and fan-made creativity.  All the elements of that tension 
are at play here.  Fair uses are recurrently turned into “feared uses” and copyright 
becomes absolute.  The rightsholders often issue a cease-and-desist letter to 
intimidate users and fan-authors, who are often clueless as to the full extent of the 
protection attached to copyright.284  As media guru Henry Jenkins noted, “[i]n such 
situations, the studios often assert much broader control than they could legally 
defend:  someone who stands to lose their home or their kid’s college funds by going 
head-to-head with studio attorneys is apt to fold.”285  Although fair use defenses can 
be put forward on solid grounds, as many authors have argued,286 users are unaware 
or at least confused about where to draw the line.  Most of the time, they retreat and 
give up their creative projects.  For this very reason, there is no case law on non-
commercial fan-made creativity.287 
Liability concerns of platforms hosting fan-made creativity, then, add up to the 
chilling effects of the copyright system.  In order to shield Internet Service Providers 
(“ISPs”) from liability, legislatures worldwide have enacted DMCA-like notice-and-
takedown procedures.288  Recently, a DMCA notice was good enough to take down an 
entire world, albeit a virtual one.289  This is disappointing news for fans of Second 
Life’s role-playing “Sim” based around Frank Herbert’s famous Dune series.  
Following the DMCA notice of copyright infringement from Trident Media Group, the 
agency administering Herbert’s estate, Linden Lab, gave two days to the Sim’s 
administrators to comply with the rightsholders’ requests and remove all the Dune-
themed items, characters and names. 290   As Reichmann argued, the DMCA 
“shamelessly sacrificed the public interest provisions of copyright law on the altar of” 
private interest.291  In fact, the DMCA notice-and-takedown process has given the 
copyright holders a new leverage weapon that makes the spectre of copyright shine 
even brighter in the nebula of “user-generated” confusion.292  The recent copyright 
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holders’ strategy has increasingly been to seek enforcement of ISPs’ secondary 
liability with the overt goal of turning them into watchdogs.  The response of Linden 
Lab to Herbert’s estate is indicative of the considerable success of this strategy. 
In many different forms, users appropriate from commercial culture to create 
their own culture.293  In doing so, users ignore copyright law.  In order to create 
fanvids, fanfiction, musical mash-up, machinima, or reproduce a video clip to be 
discussed or perhaps decontextualized, users infringe on copyright.  At the same 
time, users create without an interest in how copyright law would protect their works 
and “de-commodify” the commercial culture from which they have appropriated.294  
By ignoring copyright, however, users, and their own emerging digital culture, are at 
the mercy of the commercial culture that they have appropriated.  Mainstream 
corporate-driven culture may use copyright law or its specter to marginalize 
competing or alternative cultural paradigms.  Even if user-generated culture is 
tolerated,295 its terms of service are set by commercial culture, and spearheaded by 
copyright law.  At its own will, mainstream corporate-driven culture can prevent 
users from building their own cultures or influence the directions that such cultures 
will take.  A couple of years after the Dune Sim in Second Life was shut down, fans 
are still looking for a home where they can enjoy their common passion absent the 
irrational, arbitrary, and inconsistent reactions of copyright holders to fan-made 
creativity.  In responding to one user looking for people interested in role playing in 
the Dune universe and coming to know that the Dune Sim was no more because of 
the rightsholder’s complaint, Vashara comments: 
Wow, really I’m a Dune fan myself and a star wars roleplayer.  Weird how 
they shut down dune and yet the whole star wars and harry potter sims 
never got shut down nor did the legend of the seeker roleplays.  I think its 
[sic] stupid, infact [sic] when you roleplay you’re actually advertising and 
promiting  [sic] their product, because people will see and ask what is Dune, 
and we tell them its [sic] a good and then they go read it, thus making more 
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money for the authors and publishing companies. Duh, lol, are they that 
thick?296 
IV. CLOSING ARGUMENT 
For most of human history, the essential nature of creativity was understood to 
be cumulative and collective.  We have built most of our culture under a paradigm in 
which appropriation and the “art of rewriting” was a value for creativity, rather than 
a nuisance.  Epic and popular culture thrived under that creative paradigm.  Modern 
copyright and authorship law, however, turns the very propulsive engine of the 
creative process—appropriation, imitation, and borrowing of the tradition to build 
follow-on creativity—into a nuisance, rather than a foundational block.  User-based 
creativity, empowered by digital technology and networked distribution, can help the 
resurgence of a flourishing popular culture.  As authors have noted, “fan-made 
derivative works based on works of popular culture have a growing importance in 
twenty-first century culture, and in fact represent the rebirth of popular folk culture 
in America [and elsewhere] after a century of being submerged beneath commercial 
mass-media cultural products.”297 
A. From Exclusivity to Inclusivity 
As Debora Halbert noted, “[w]e need a cultural world where de-commodified 
culture prevails and people are able to build something creative on the foundation of 
what already exists.”298  The problem lies in what Lessig has referred to as the 
tension between a “free” and a “permission” culture:  “we come from a tradition of 
‘free culture.’ . . . The opposite of a free culture is a ‘permission culture’—a culture in 
which creators get to create only with the permission of the powerful, or of creators 
from the past.”299  It is the overexpansion of a “permission” culture that collides with 
the traditional mechanics of creativity and the democratic value that creativity 
encloses. 
It particularly curtails modern forms of digital creativity.  The interactive 
nature of the web 2.0 has propelled user-generated creativity that thrives in a “free” 
culture and withers in a “permission” culture. 300   In the digital age, users and 
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creators have an enhanced interest in free and open re-use of intellectual content.  
Fanfiction community, machinima and mash-up communities, and in general online 
communities based upon user-generated content build their creative ethics over open 
re-use and remix.  Mass collaboration, mass creativity, and collective and networked 
peer production enhance and multiply the value of re-use.  After the advent of the 
web 2.0, the enjoyment of creativity becomes more and more an interactive process, 
and creativity becomes more and more a phenomenon of collective production.  The 
capacity of easily remixing content turns users into authors with global and 
instantaneous capacity for distributing their own works. 
In order to adjust the copyright system to the modern networked digital 
creativity, one necessary measure may be an inversion of the traditional copyright 
permission rule.  The rejection of the copyright permission rule should be coupled 
with the implementation of additional mechanisms to provide economic incentive to 
creation, such as a liability rule integrated into the system or possibly an 
apportionment of profits.  The re-definition of the traditional copyright permission 
paradigm would fit, in my view, within the partial de-construction of the post-
romantic paradigm which over-emphasizes creative individualism and absolute 
originality.  It would serve the goal of reconnecting creativity with its cumulative 
nature. 
Given that the moral right of attribution will always remain the cornerstone of 
any revised creativity management system, 301  one should distinguish between 
reproductive use and creative use of intellectual works.  I believe that creative use 
should be allowed to the public at large with no permission required in order to 
perform it.  As it was traditionally for most of human cultural history, the right to 
appropriate expressions should be absolute.  On the absolutistic nature of the right to 
borrow and reuse others’ creativity, I follow in the footsteps of David Lange, Jefferson 
Powel, and Jed Rubenfeld.302  I do not see meaningful reasons for the appropriation 
to not extend beyond private appropriation for personal use and include competitive 
or commercial uses, if the right mechanisms to compensate authors are in place. I 
therefore locate my proposal within the framework set by Lange and Powel in the 
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following terms:  “a provision for apportioning revenues resulting from competitive 
appropriation, one that is calculated to preserve incentives to create the original 
work without impairing the absolute freedom of others to bend that work to the 
service of their own further expression.”303  I think that each creator should enjoy (1) 
a statutory royalty upon any revenue stream coming from the derivative work (2) 
upon a claim to be made within a certain period.  This way, if the incentive to create 
was based on the foreseeability of reaping any benefit from derivative works, the 
author should diligently and promptly patrol the market.304  The royalty scheme may 
be implemented so that the quality and market success of the original work is taken 
into consideration.  A solution may be to maintain a fixed statutory royalty in 
accordance with different classes related to the type and diffusion of the works.  
Technology will definitely help to calculate quality and impact of the borrowed 
materials.  The author will have the burden to show any supporting evidence to have 
the work included in a certain class.305 
In a similar fashion to that envisioned for creative uses, no permission would be 
required to make commercial reproductive use of an intellectual work.  In contrast to 
the case of creative use, the compensatory regime for reproductive uses would be 
closer to a liability regime.306  In this case, in fact, there is no contribution to the 
creative process to balance the appropriation of another’s creativity.  Therefore, the 
creator has the right to internalize the full market value of the appropriated work.  
In any event, the compensation to the author should never be inferior to the market 
price set by the author, if the author chooses to directly sell the work.  Far more 
effectively than with creative uses, digital watermarking technologies would allow 
almost perfect tracking of the commercial life of the work.  In contrast, public non-
commercial reproductive use, which includes peer-to-peer piracy, would be in the sole 
domain of the author.  Only the author would be entitled to authorize the 
reproduction, circulation, and distribution of her works for non-commercial uses.  
Present exceptions and limitations will apply to that exclusive right.  Cultural flat- 
                                                                                                                                                 
303 LANGE & POWELL, supra note 302, at 143, 181. 
304 See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. 
L. REV. 1569, 1603–24 (2009); Loren, supra note 300, at 34 (arguing for the necessity of taking 
motivation into account when determining the scope of copyright protection). 
305 I realize that adjustment and polishing of the arrangement that I am supporting need to be 
done, especially in relation to the inclusion of more than one work in the new derivative work.  At 
the moment, I will pass on this, as a detailed definition of the system would need a treatment on its 
own, which is beyond the scope of my present undertaking. 
306  See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1120 (1972); Louis Kaplow & 
Steven Shavell, Property Rules versus Liability Rules:  An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
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Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1781 (2000); Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy Lewis, 
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GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 337–66 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman 
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Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1376 (1996); Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual 
Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 254 (2009). 
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rate mechanisms, 307  alternative compensation systems, 308  or extended collective 
licensing schemes309 will most likely be introduced to decriminalize peer-to-peer file 
exchange, fix the orphan work problem, and ease non-commercial digitization 
projects. 
The implementation of a creativity management system along these guidelines 
may have actual substantial advantages for the authors.  Each use of their works 
may be a potential source of revenues.  Further, the absence of transaction costs for 
licensing the rights may boost the number of derivative and reproductive uses.  
Additionally, creators’ revenues will be attached to the success of creativity 
cumulatively made on top of their own.  This, in turn, may have positive social 
externalities, by connecting directly individual economic success with the success of 
other individuals and the surrounding creative community.  Creativity would return 
to being an inclusive, rather than exclusive, medium. 
B. From the Oral Formulaic Tradition to Digital Remix  
Rereading the history of aesthetic is particularly inspiring at the dawn of the 
networked age.  The Internet may be a privileged venue to reproduce the mechanics 
of the oral tradition.310  It is difficult to overlook the special connection that the 
mechanics of pre-modern creativity share with post-modern forms of digital 
creativity.  The dynamics of sharing of pre-modern creativity, together with the 
cumulative nature of the oral-formulaic creative process, parallel the features of 
digital networked creativity.  Digital creativity reconnects its exponential generative 
capacity to the ubiquity of participatory contributions.  As in the oral-formulaic 
                                                                                                                                                 
307 See Alain Modot et al., The “Content Flat-Rate”:  A Solution to Illegal File-Sharing?, in 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICY, POLICY DEPARTMENT B:  
STRUCTURAL AND COHESION POLICIES, CULTURE AND EDUCATION 65–102 (2011), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/download.do?language=en&file=44308; 
INSTITUT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES MEDIENRECHT [INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN MEDIA LAW] (EML), DIE 
ZULÄSSIGKEIT EINER KULTURFLATRATE NACH NATIONALEM UND EUROPÄISCHEM RECHT [THE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF A CULTURAL FLAT RATE UNDER NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW] 63 (2009) 
available at http://www.gruene-bundestag.de/cms/netzpolitik/dokbin/278/278059.kurzgutachten 
_zur_kulturflatrate.pdf; Bernt Hugenholtz, Lucie Guibault, & Sjoerd Van Geffen, The Future Of 
Levies In A Digital Environment, in INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATION LAW (2003), available at 
http://www.ivir.nl/ publications/ other/DRM&levies-report.pdf. 
308 See WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP:  TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE FUTURE OF 
ENTERTAINMENT 9 (2004); Neil W. Netanel, Impose A Noncommercial Use Levy To Allow Free Peer-
To-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 77 (2003). 
309 See, e.g., Marco Ciurcina, Juan Carlos De martin, Thomas Margoni, Federico Morando, and 
Marco Ricolfi, Creatività Remunerata, Conoscenza Liberata:  File Sharing e Licenze Collettive Estese 
[Remunerating Creativity, Freeing Knowledge: File-Sharing and Extended Collective Licenses], 
NEXA CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY (2009), available at http://nexa.polito.it/licenzecollettive; 
Johan Axhamn and Lucie Guibault, Cross-border Extended Collective Licensing: a Solution to Online 
Dissemination of Europe’s Cultural Heritage?, IViR (2011), available at 
http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/guibault/ECL_Europeana_final_report092011.pdf. 
310  See THE PATHWAYS PROJECT, ORAL TRADITION AND INTERNET TECHNOLOGY, 
http://www.pathwaysproject.org/pathways/show/HomePage (last visited Jan. 19, 2014) (drawing 
parallels between the media dynamics of oral traditions and the Internet). 
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tradition, mass collaboration is a key element of production in the digital 
environment. 
Again, emerging creative productions, including remix, mash-up, musical 
sampling, vidding, and the creative process developing in Youtube-like environments, 
implement the logic of the traditional oral-formulaic creative production. It does so by 
cumulatively building creativity over the reuse, expansion, and reassembling of 
minimal bits of creative discourse.  The sample and the clip of the remix tradition 
correspond to the formula of the oral tradition.  The formula, the single unit to be 
used and reused, worked and reworked, is the inspiring paradigm of the remix 
culture. 
Moreover, digital creativity re-implements the same mechanics of pre-copyright 
creativity that envisioned borrowing and copying as a necessary tribute to previous 
works.  As in the pre-modern tradition, digital creativity deploys appropriation and 
borrowing as imitative and emulative instruments.  From fanfiction to “machinima” 
and fangames, from thematic Sims in virtual worlds to vidding or music mash-up, 
modern digital creativity is made of appropriation, borrowing, and imitation that are 
laid out to create new meanings and find new inferences.  They are intended to pay 
tribute to the iconography of the commercial popular culture as well as to challenge, 
deconstruct, and overcome it. 
Social textuality and intertextuality, which are dominating features of medieval 
creativity, play a pivotal role in the digital domain as well.  On one hand, the 
intertextual nature of medieval literary culture, as a constant reference to authority 
and tradition to which the textile metaphor of the word “text” evokes, shows an 
affinity with the hyper-textuality of digital culture and creativity.  Linking is a built-
in feature of creativity produced in a digital environment.  On the other hand, the 
social malleability of the text in pre-modern manuscript culture finds a parallel in 
mass-collaborative projects in the digital environment, such as Wikipedia. 
Finally, the networked society sets the preconditions for a social and 
collaborative idea of authorship that resembles the pre-modern collectivistic idea of 
creativity.  More conspicuously than ever, digital creativity is deeply intertwined 
with communitarian actions and reactions.  Open source software developments, 
Wikipedia, fangames, and thematic “Sims” grow out of peer and mass-collaborative 
creative projects.  Vidding, “machinima,” musical sampling and mash-up compose a 
puzzle of responses and memes as part of a hyper-reactive community environment.  
In the digital environment, creativity returns to be an inclusive, rather than 
exclusive, medium.  This may suggest that, in the networked information society and 
economy, we are witnessing the demise of the individualistic idea of authorship that 
gave birth to our copyright system. 
The parallel between formula, remix, and mash-up, intertextual medieval 
creativity and hyper-textual digital creativity, social textuality and mass-
collaboration in the manuscript and digital culture, may suggest an emerging 
dystonia between the post-romantic paradigm of authorship and the present cultural 
and creative landscape.  This dystonia reverberates on the obsolescence of the 
present policies for creativity.  It suggests that the communal, collaborative, and 
cumulative role of creativity should be emphasized and promoted.  The emergence of 
the digital participative culture may offer the opportunity to realign creativity with 
its original participative nature.  As in pre-modern culture, the idea of inclusivity in 
the discourse about creativity has regained momentum with the emphasis on 
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community, participation, and mass and cumulative production in the digital 
environment.  As in pre-modern culture, a re-emerging social consciousness indicates 
that creativity must serve as an instrument to empower the individual to be part of a 
community, rather than stand out of it. 
Change in our creative environment is in progress.  In the twilight of a system, 
it may be inspiring to look at the dawn of our knowledge governance in order to 
understand how to start the new day to come.  Digital technology and creativity look 
back at the generative capacity of the traditional cumulative, collaborative, and 
communitarian mechanics of creativity as an evidentiary basis for reform. 
Reporting a last quip from my fantastic trial, and playing the role of Chuck D’s 
attorney one more time, as a last question, I asked Homer, “Do you think we would 
have had the Iliad and the Odyssey if Bridgeport and the like was the law in force at 
the time?” 
Homer decidedly said, “No.” 
“I have no further questions.” 
